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EDWARD A. FITZGERALD*

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:
Isolated Waters, Migratory Birds,
Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court, through its statutory and
constitutional interpretations, has revived federalism to curtail
federal authority. In the Solid Waste case, the Court, relying
primarily on the text of the Clean Water Act, determined that the
federal government lacked jurisdiction over isolated waters that
serve as migratory bird habitat. The Court's decision was
inconsistent with text, intent, and purposes of the statute. The
Court reinforced its statutory interpretationby declaring that the
migratory bird rule probably exceeded federal commerce clause
authority. The Court's speculation was dubious under the
framework of United States v. Lopez. The Court's conclusions
are not a positive sign for thefuture of environmentallaw.
INTRODUCTION
One of the hallmarks of the Rehnquist Court is the resurrection
of federalism to limit federal authority.! The Court is accomplishing this

* Professor, Department of Political Science, Wright State University. Ph.D. 1983,
Boston University; M.A. 1976, Northeastern University; J.D. 1974, Boston College Law
School; B.A. 1971, Holy Cross College.
1. From 1937 through 1995, the Supreme Court deferred to congressional determinations that activities were sufficiently related to interstate commerce to justify federal regulation pursuant to the commerce clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-56
(1995). The Court only asked whether the decision was rational and whether the means
chosen were reasonably related to the ends sought. Id. at 557. In 1995, the Court changed
the conceptual framework for assessing federal commerce clause authority. Id. See generally
Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial
Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000); Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional
Findings, ConstitutionalAdjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695
(1996).
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goal through statutory and constitutional interpretation.2 The Court
advanced its agenda in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) 3 by invalidating the Corps of
Engineers' (Corps) "migratory bird rule,"4 which asserted federal
jurisdiction over the discharge of dredge and fill material into isolated
waters and wetlands that serve as migratory bird habitat pursuant to
section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).5 This article analyzes the
Court's decision, which puts in jeopardy as much as 60 percent of the
nation's wetlands 6 and threatens to harm migratory birds, and concludes
that the decision was erroneous.
The SWANCC decision raised several issues. First, there is the
problem of statutory interpretation, particularly the conflict between
textualism and intentionalism. The Court, relying primarily on the text,7
held that the migratory bird rule exceeded the scope of federal
jurisdiction in the CWA.8 The Court's conclusion did not follow the text,
intent, or purposes of the CWA, which clearly establishes broad federal
jurisdiction. Instead, the Court substituted its views for those of
Congress. Second, there are questions about the role of administrative
agencies regarding statutory interpretation. The Court, relying on the
canons of statutory interpretation, refused to defer to the Corps'
interpretation of the CWA because there was no clear statement
regarding congressional intent and the migratory bird rule raised
constitutional issues regarding federalism.9 The Court's decision
undermined the principle of judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretation. The Court ignored strong executive precedent and
invalidated a regulation that had been in place for 15 years, followed by
three administrations, and upheld in most judicial decisions. Finally,
there are concerns regarding the scope of federal commerce clause
2. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. See also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
3. 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001).
4. Dept. of Defense, Corps of Engineers, Dept. of Army, Final Rule for Regulatory
Programs of the Corps, Consolidation of Corps Permit Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206;
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. Parts 320, 321, 322, 324-30).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). Isolated waters are waters that "lack a hydrologic connection to other waters that are part of or adjacent to interstate waters, a tributary system, or
traditionally navigable waters." Bonnie Nevel, Focus on SWANCC, NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 2.
6. Jon Kusler, The SWANCC Decision and State Regulation of Wetlands, Memo prepared
for the Association of State Wetland Managers, Inc., 1, 7-8 (2001), availableat www.aswm.
org/propub/pubs/aswm-publist.htm (last updated Jan. 31, 2002); Jon Kusler, The
SWANCC Decision and the States-Fillin the Gaps or Declare Open Season?, NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 9-12.
7. Michael P. Healy, Textualism's Limits on the Administrative State: of Isolated Waters,
Barking Dogs, and Chevron, 31 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,928, 10,929-37 (2001).
8. SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. at 684.
9. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675,683-84 (2001).
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authority. The Court reinforced its statutory interpretation by suggesting
that the migratory bird rule probably exceeded federal commerce clause
authority. 10 This conclusion was dubious in terms of the Court's decision
in United States v. Lopez."
The article examines the Court's statutory analysis in the context
of the conceptual framework of Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council.12 It analyzes the migratory bird rule in terms of the
Court's current commerce clause jurisprudence. Finally, it reviews the
about the
political responses to the Court's decision and speculates
law. 3
decision's future implications for environmental
I. FACTS
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC),
an association of 23 suburban cities in Cook County Illinois, was formed
in 1988 to pursue "a comprehensive action plan for regional solid waste
disposal." 4 The SWANCC adopted a 20-year management plan for solid
waste disposal' 5 that called for the construction of a new landfill for the
disposal of baled nonhazardous waste. The SWANCC purchased 533
acres of property, 300 acres of which had previously been used for gravel
and sand strip mining; 410 acres would be utilized for the balefill site.
There were over 200 seasonal and permanent ponds on the site ranging
from one-tenth of an acre to several acres, with a depth varying from
several inches to several feet. The initial plan called for filling in 31 acres
of wetlands. 6
10. Id. at 683.
11. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (the Gun-Free School Zones Act was declared unconstitutional
for exceeding federal commerce clause authority).
12. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13. Judge Wald, a former member of the D.C. Circuit, stated, "The law of the
environment, like the environment itself, is a seamless web: '[p]luck at any one point in the
intricate fabric of our ecosystem and the web of relationships changes shape, disrupting the
previous equilibrium.' Patricia M. Wald, The Role of the Judiciary in Environmental
Protection, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 519, 535 (1992) (quoting THOMAS M. HOBAN &
RICHARD 0. BROOKS, GREEN JUSTICE: THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE COURTS 6 (1987)).
14. Brief for the Petitioner at 3, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675
(2001) (No. 99-1178). The Illinois Solid Waste Planning and Recycling Act encourages such
"intergovernmental cooperation agreements whereby various units of local government
within a region determine the best methods and locations for disposal of solid waste." 415
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/2 (1993).
15. Brief for the Petitioner at 3, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675
(2001) (No. 99-1178). The plan stressed waste volume reduction, recycling, composting, and
other ways to divert 40 to 45 percent of solid waste from disposal in compliance with the
Solid Waste Planning and Recycling Act, 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/2 (1993), and Illinois Environmental Protection Agency rules, 35 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 870.102 (2002).
16. Brief for the Petitioner at 4-5, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct.
675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
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The SWANCC asked the Corps if a dredge and fill permit was
necessary. Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit issued by the Corps
for the discharge of dredge and fill material into navigable waters of the
United States. 17 In 1986 and again in 1987, the Corps informed the
SWANCC that a section 404 permit would not be necessary because the
proposed site was not subject to their regulatory authority.'8
In 1987, the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission informed the
Corps that migratory birds were observed on the site. The Corps asserted
jurisdiction over the site pursuant to the migratory bird rule 9 and
informed the SWANCC that a section 404 permit would be necessary.'
On the site there are 121 different species of birds that depend on water
and migrate throughout the United States. Many of the species are
protected by international treaties. The site contains the second largest
breeding colony of blue herons in northeast Illinois. There were
approximately 192 nests in 1993. The ponds are the breeding habitat for
several species considered endangered or threatened by the Illinois
Endangered Species Protection Board.2'
In 1990, the SWANCC's request for a section 404 permit was
denied. The Corps concluded that the project was in the public interest
and the foreseeable benefits exceeded the costs, but the "site may not be
17.

33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).

18.

Brief for the Petitioner at 8-9, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct.

675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
19. The Corps asserted jurisdiction "based on the following criteria: 1) the proposed
site had been abandoned as a gravel mining operation; 2) the water areas and spoil piles
had developed a natural character; and 3) the water areas are used as habitat by migratory
bird[s] which cross state lines." SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. at 679.
20.
Obtaining a permit is a two stage process. First, pursuant to CWA Section 401 the Corps requires the applicant to provide a "State [certification]
that the proposed discharge will comply with applicable provisions of
State Law," including "water quality standards."...The Illinois EPA issued
water quality certifications to SWANCC in November 1989 and again in
December 1992.
Second, the Corps makes "an environmental assessment, and a
determination of the project's impact on the public interest," weighing in
its "public interest" determination such factors as "economics, aesthetics,
general environmental concerns,...fish and wildlife values,.. .land
use,...and, in general, the needs and welfare of the people. Though the
Corps purports to recognize that "primary responsibility for determining
zoning and land use matters rests with state [and] local governments," it
declines to "accept decisions by such governments" where "there are
significant issues" it deems "of overriding national importance" given "the
degree of impact in [the] individual case."
Brief for the Petitioner at 9, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001)
(No. 99-1178) (citations omitted).
21. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 7, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121
S. Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
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the least damaging practicable alternative site" and the project "would
contribute to significant degradation of the aquatic ecosystem."'
The SWANCC proposed a mitigation plan that would cost $17
million. The plan called for the reduction in the area to be filled from 31
to 17.6 acres. A breeding area for the herons would be relocated on the
property. If this proved unsuccessful, a breeding area would be provided
at another site. The construction would begin in phases over 15 years.
The forest and waters on the property would be enhanced. To improve
forest habitat, 258 acres adjacent to the property would be acquired. 2 The
project received the necessary state and local approval.
In 1994, the Corps again rejected the SWANCC's request for a
section 404 permit on grounds that the project was contrary to the public
interest and federal regulations for the following reasons: (1) the break
up of such "a large contiguous forest" would cause "unmitigable
impacts to area sensitive birds"; (2) the SWANCC had not demonstrated
that this was "the least environmentally damaging, most practical
alternative"; and (3) the SWANCC had not proved that its members
possessed the capacity to finance the "'long-term maintenance
responsibilities', which created an 'unacceptable' risk of groundwater
contamination. "5
The Corps found the site particularly important because the loss
of similar wooded aquatic habitats in the region was responsible for the
drop in bird population. The Corps' decision was supported by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which concluded that "[b]ecause of its
value to migratory birds, we do not believe this site is an appropriate
place to site a landfill." 26 The FWS determined that the blue herons
would likely abandon the site. Existing sites had to be preserved because
the habitat for forest birds in the Midwest was lacking. The FWS was
aware of the solid waste disposal problem but felt that the preservation

22. Brief for the Petitioner at 9, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675
(2001) (No. 99-1178).
23. Id. at 5.
24. By 1993, SWANCC received a "special use planned development permit from the
Cook County Board of Appeals, a landfill development permit from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, and approval from the Illinois Department of Conservation."
SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. at 679. Several commentators noted that "[n]early every contested
federal wetlands permit decision-and they are numerous-is one that, by federal regulation, already received all necessary state approvals." Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland,
Federalismin Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404
and Related Programsto the States, 54 MD. L. REv. 1242,1253 (1995).
25. Brief for the Petitioner at 10, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675
(2001) (No. 99-1178).
26. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 9, 2000 WL 1369439, SWANCC v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
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of habitat was equally important. 7 The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) concurred with the Corps' decision.28
The SWANCC brought suit, challenging the Corps' jurisdiction
over the site. The federal district court upheld the Corps' decision and
determined that the commerce clause authorized the Corps' regulation
of isolated waters that could provide habitat for migratory birds.' The
Corps' interpretation of the CWA was reasonable.' The migratory bird
rule was an interpretative rule, so notice and comment 3 was not
warranted.32
The Seventh Circuit concurred and held that the cumulative
impact on tourism, hunting, and observation resulting from the
destruction of migratory bird habitat would substantially affect interstate
commerce.' The management of migratory birds, which are the subject
of many international treaties, was not a local issue.- The Seventh Circuit
agreed that the Corps' interpretation of the CWA was reasonable. There
was no need to focus on potential impacts because filling in 17.6 acres of
isolated waters would have an immediate impact on the birds.m The
Seventh Circuit also agreed that the migratory bird rule was an
interpretative rule that did not require notice and comment.'
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Corps'
jurisdiction under section 404 of the CWA was limited to waters
navigable in fact. 37 The Court did not find any evidence in the legislative
history to support an extension of the Corps' jurisdiction to isolated

27. Id.
28. Congress passed the Water Resources Development Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100676, 102 Stat. 4012 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2312 et seq. (2000)), which provided that prior to
issuing a section 404 permit for the proposed SWANCC landfill, the Secretary of the Army
was to consult with the EPA and consider the impacts on the Newark Aquifer and on
drinking water supplies. The EPA initially determined that the project posed little risk. The
EPA later amended its finding and held that "the project site is inherently unsuitable for a
project of this type due to the hazard of possible groundwater contamination of the
Newark Valley Aquifer." Brief for the Respondents Village of Bartlett and Citizens Against
the Balefill at 8, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
29. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 998 F. Supp. 946,950-53 (N.D. II. 1998).
30. Id. at 954-955.
31. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
32. SWANCC, 998 F. Supp. at 955-57.
33. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999). The
Seventh Circuit determined that Lopez recognized "the cumulative impact doctrine, under
which a single activity that itself has no discernible effect on interstate commerce may still
be regulated if the aggregate effect of that class of activity has a substantial impact on interstate commerce." Id. at 850.
34. Id. at 850-51.
35. Id. at 851-52.
36. Id. at 852-53.
37. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675, 680-83 (2001).
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waters.3 ' The Court refused to defer to the Corps' interpretation of the
statute, which was on the boundaries of constitutional authority. A clear
statement in the text of the statute was necessary to support such
jurisdiction. 8 The Court also noted that even if Congress had authorized
the migratory bird rule, it would probably violate the commerce clause
by intruding on traditional state authority. 0 The Court's decision was
inconsistent with the text, intent, and purposes of the CWA, the Corps
and EPA interpretations of the CWA, and the scope of federal commerce
clause authority.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: STEP ONE
The Court's decision in SWANCC involved questions of
statutory interpretation, particularly the conflict between textualism and
intentionalism.41 When examining an agency's legal interpretation of a
statute, the court utilizes the two-step conceptual framework provided in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
(hereinafter Chevron).' The first step requires the court to determine
"whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue."43 The
court examines the text, intent, and purposes of the statute." This
technique, which is known as originalism, recognizes the statute as the
command of the sovereign that must be interpreted by other agencies of
government.'
If Congress has not addressed the question, the court can "not
simply impose its own construction on the statute."' The court moves to

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 683-84.
Id.
See generally EDWARD A. FITZGERALD, THE SEAWEED REBELLION: FEDERAL-STATE

CONFLICrS OVER OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 5-26 (2001).

42. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
43. Id. at 842-43. The courts employ Chevron in a strong and weak manner. A strong
reading requires the court to defer to the agency's legal interpretation, unless Congress has
specifically addressed the issue. A weak reading stresses the continued use of the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, which focus on the text, intent, and purpose of
the statute. Kenneth W. Starr et al., JudicialReview of Administrative Action in a Conservative
Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353,367-71 (1987).
44. Justice Stevens, the author of the Chevron decision, later stated that the courts
decide "pure question[s] of statutory construction" by "[e]mploying traditional tools of
statutory construction." INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,446 (1987).
45. See Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV.
405, 467 (1989); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation,68 TUL. L.
REV. 803, 804-05 (1994); William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626
(1990).
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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the second step to decide "whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."47 The court does not have to
conclude that the agency's interpretation is "the only one it permissibly
could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding." 4 Instead, the court must defer to49 "a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency."
The Court in SWANCC relied primarily on the statutory text to
limit the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA. Focusing on the text
allowed the Court to ignore clear signals in legislative history and5
statutory purposes regarding the broad scope of federal jurisdiction. 0
The Court acted as an autonomous interpreter, solving the statutory
puzzle through ingenuity, rather than a faithful agent of the legislature
or administrative agency, discovering meaning through an archeological
search.5'This enabled the Court to establish its own policy preferences.52
A. Text
The court begins by examining the text of the statute, which has
been enacted into law through the constitutionally prescribed process.53
The text, which is known to the litigants and the public, is the best
evidence of legislative intent. Reliance on the text confines the court's
inquiry, increases the probability of obtaining judicial agreement in a
particular case, and provides certainty and predictability in the law.54
Textualism examines definitions, grammatical construction, and canons
of statutory interpretation. Textualism also reviews the structure of the
statute to see how words are utilized in the statute and how the
definition fits in with the statute as a whole. 55

47.

Id.

48.
49.

Id. at 843 n.11.
Id. at 844.

50.

See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.

U. L.Q. 351,355-63 (1994).
51. Id. at 373-74.

52.

See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia's Revolutionary Call to

Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV. 121, 123 (2000).
53. For a discussion of the rise of textualism, see Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization

of LegislativeHistory in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIs. L. REv. 205,212-21.
54. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, UpdatingStatutory Interpretation,87 MIcH. L. REV. 20, 23-24
(1988); Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal
System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 320 (1997).
55. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv.321, 340-41 (1990); Eskridge, supra note 45, at 660-63; Richard C.

Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C. L. REV. 187, 234-35
(1993).
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Textualism poses several interpretative problems. First, the text
alone is generally insufficient to determine statutory meaning because it
is ambiguous, vague, or incomplete. Words do not have clear meaning
outside the context in which they are used." Second, textualism does not
foster a sensible reading of the statute that is designed to carry out the
legislative intent or purpose. Instead, the court undermines legislative
bargains and fails to acknowledge signals sent by the Congress
regarding interpretative problems. 7 Textualism makes the judge an
"autonomous interpreter," rather than a faithful agent of the legislature."
Finally, textualism is based on the "benign fiction" that legislators know
the canons of statutory construction, prior judicial precedents, and the
existing statutory terrain and that rational legislators write clear text.5
The Court in SWANCC held the Corps' jurisdiction pursuant to
the CWA is limited to waters navigable in fact or connected to navigable
waters, such as adjacent wetlands. Isolated waters with no connection to
navigable waters, except for their use as migratory bird habitat, are
beyond the Corps' jurisdiction.60
The Court's holding, which relied primarily upon the text, 1 is
too narrow. The CWA establishes federal jurisdiction over navigable
waters, which are defined as "the waters of the United States."6 2 The
CWA recognizes that navigable waters are not limited to those utilized
for interstate conmmerce.63 Numerous courts have determined that
navigability is not crucial to the scope of federal jurisdiction under the
CWA.6
56. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 55, at 341-44.
57. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 738 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 718, 727-28 (1987); Eskridge, supra note 45, at 683.
58. Merrill, supra note 50, at 353.
59. See generally Eskridge, supra note 45, at 679-80; Redish & Chung, supra note 45, at
825-26; Nicholas S. Zeppos, LegislativeHistory and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a FactFindingModel of Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1311-15 (1990).
60. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675,680-81 (2001).
61. Id. at 680; see also Healy supra note 7, at 10,929-37.
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g) (2000).
64. NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.C. 1975); United States v. Holland, 373 F.
Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th
Cir. 1974); P.F.Z. Props. Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975); Leslie Salt Co. v.
Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
The Court in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 166 (1979), supported broad
federal regulation over navigable waters pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act. The
Court stated, "[rleference to the navigability of a waterway adds little if anything to the
breadth of Congress' regulatory power over interstate commerce." Id. at 173. Congressional
authority over waters of the United States "does not depend on a stream's 'navigability."'
Id. at 174. Numerous "economic activities 'affect' interstate commerce and thus are
susceptible of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause irrespective of
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For example, the Supreme Court in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc.6 upheld federal jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent
to, but not hydrologically connected to, navigable waters pursuant to the
CWA. The Court stated that "the term 'navigable' as used in the Act is of
limited import."6 Congress clearly "intended to repudiate limits that had
been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control
statutes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to
regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable'
under the classical understanding of that term." 67
The Court's restrictive view in SWANCC is contrary to section
404(g) of the CWA, which specifically recognizes federal jurisdiction
over navigable waters other than those waters suitable for commercial
traffic.6 The Court addressed this issue and concluded that "[tihe exact
meaning of section 404(g) is not before us and we express no opinion on
it."' The Court's conclusion is contrary to the expressed legislative intent
on this question.7°
B. Intent
If the text does not answer the interpretative problem, the court
must search through the "ashcans of the legislative process"71 to discover
legislative intent,7 which is how the enacting legislature would have
resolved the interpretative question.7 Studying the legislative history

whether navigation, or, indeed, water, is involved." Id. Judicial decisions regarding federal
authority over "waters used in interstate commerce are consequently best understood
when viewed in terms of more traditional Commerce Clause analysis than by reference to
whether the stream in fact is capable of supporting navigation or may be characterized as
'navigable water of the United States"' Id. at 174.
65. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
66. Id. at 133.
67. Id.
68. Section 404(g) allows the states to assume authority over "the discharge of dredged
or fill material into the navigable waters (other than those waters which are presently used,
or are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a
means to transport interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high water
mark, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to
their mean high water mark, or mean higher high water mark on the west coast, including
wetlands adjacent thereto) within its jurisdiction." 33 U.S.C. 1344(g) (2000).
69. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675, 682 (2001).
70. See infra text and notes 158-172.
71. CHARLES P. CuRTIs, IT's YOUR LAW 52 (1954).
72. For a discussion on the existence of legislative intent, see Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930); REED DIcKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 68-69 (1975); Tiefer, supra note 53, at 207-08, 251-71; Eskridge,
supra note 45, at 643-50.
73. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, asserted,
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places the court in the proper deferential framework regarding the
legislature and establishes a criterion of reliability that helps the court74 to
select and weigh elements of the language and the legislative context.
There are some problems with legislative history. Judge
Leventhal stated that using legislative history is like "looking over a
crowd and picking your friends."m First, focusing on legislative intent
draws attention away from the text, which has been enacted into law.
Second, examining legislative history introduces uncertainty into the law
because alleged contradictions provide the opportunity for judicial
adventurism. Third, there is always the danger that the legislative
history was manufactured to influence subsequent judicial decisions.
Finally, legislative history is produced by the staff, not the congress76
persons.
Despite these problems, the benefits of legislative history far
exceed any of the alleged costs. First, legislative history does not replace
the text, but is utilized to explain the text. This avoids absurd results,
illuminates drafting errors, and explains specialized meanings.7 Second,
the use of legislative history decreases judicial adventurism by focusing
judicial attention on the legislative product and decreasing judicial
autonomy. Legislative history provides guidance in the face of textual
silence or ambiguity. 78 Third, the court must distinguish between
m
manufactured and legitimate legislative history.7
The utilization of the

The notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also
plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification...A statute, like other living
organisms, derives significance and sustenance from its environment,
from which it cannot be severed without being mutilated. Especially is this
true where the statute, like the one before us, is part of a legislative process
having history and a purpose. The meaning of such a statute cannot be
gained by confining inquiry within its four comers. Only the historic process of which such legislation is an incomplete fragment-that to which it
gave rise as well as that which gave rise to it-can yield its true meaning.
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1943).
74. See CURTIS, supra note 71, at 52; Redish & Chung, supra note 45, at 813-15;
Aleinikoff, supra note 54, at 22-23; Eskridge, supra note 45, at 630.

75.

Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981

Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Leventhal).
76. Mikva & Lane, supra note 52, at 130-31.

77. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 845, 848-52 (1992).
78. Id. at 856.
79. Legitimate legislative history is comprised of statements that are designed to
explain the meaning of the statute and build support for its enactment. These statements
"illuminate the consensus view of the legislature where that view is left in some doubt by
the enacted language." Robert Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicial Artist: Statutes and the New
Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 246-47 (1983). Manufactured legislative history consists
of statements that are not designed to generate support for the statute but appeal to
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statutory text and purposes aids in this endeavor. There is also a
hierarchy of legislative sources that is based on their comparative
reliability.80 Finally, Congress is a bureaucratic organization.
Congresspersons rely on their staff regarding most aspects of legislative
matters.81
The Court did not find much guidance in the legislative history
of the CWA regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction.82 The Court's
appraisal of the legislative history was too brief and constrained.n The
legislative history shows federal jurisdiction in the CWA was not limited
to waters navigable in fact, which were already subject to federal
jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. The 1972 and 1977
amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) (now
known as the CWA) also endorsed broad federal jurisdiction.
1. Rivers and HarborsAppropriationAct of 1899
Prior to the enactment of amendments to the FWPCA in 1972,
the federal government already exercised jurisdiction over navigable
waters pursuant to the River and Harbor Act of 1899 (RHA).84 The RHA
grants the Corps authority to regulate dredge and fill operations in navigable waters and prohibits discharges into navigable waters and their
tributaries without a permit issued by the Corps.8 The Supreme Court

particular constituencies and influence judicial interpretation of the statute. These
statements do not reflect the consensus of the legislature. Id.
80. William Eskridge provides a list of legislative sources in the order of their
reliability: (1) committee reports, (2) sponsor statements, (3) rejected proposals, (4) floor
and hearing colloquy, (5) views of nonlegislator drafters, (6) legislative inaction, and (7)
subsequent legislative history. Eskridge, supranote 45, at 637-640.
81. Breyer, supra note 77, at 863; Tiefer, supranote 53, at 223-26.
82. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675,680-82 (2001).
83. Professor Charles Tiefer noted that "[a]rtistry with legislative history is a talent of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's which has been admired in the past, but which he has often
suppressed to avoid eliciting separate opinions by Justice Scalia." Charles Tiefer, SWANCC:
ConstitutionalSwan Songfor Environmental Laws or No More Than a Swipe at Their Sweep?, 31
ELR 11,493, 11,496 (2001).
84. Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407
(2000)). The RHA was preceded by the Rivers and Harbor Act of 1890, which allowed the
Corps to appraise and approve construction projects and dredge and fill operations on
navigable waters. See FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3-249, 3-249-3255 (2002). See also W. Christian Hoyer, Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction:
Buttressinga Citadel Under Siege, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 19, 20-29 (1973).
85. Under the common law navigable waters were limited to those subject to the ebb
and flow of the tides. Id. at 21 n.19, citing Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847); The
Orleans,36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175 (1837); The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). This
definition was inapplicable to the United States, which contains many inland waters.
Hoyer, supra note 84, at 21-22, n.20.
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continually expanded the definition of navigable waterse and shaped the
7
RHA into an instrument for pollution control.
With the emergence of the environmental movement,8 the Corps
fashioned the RHA into a tool for environmental protection.' The Corps
began to consider other values when issuing dredge and fill permits,
specifically "the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish and
wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general
public interest."90 This "public interest review" was inconsistent with the
case law, which limited the Corps' evaluation to navigational impacts.
9
The conflict was settled in Zabel v. Tabb, ' which focused on the Corps'
refusal to issue permits to fill in wetlands because of potential adverse
environmental effects. The Fifth Circuit, reversing the district court, held
that the Corps can reject a permit on environmental grounds, even
though there is no impact on navigability. The court found that Congress
86. In The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870), the Court adopted a "navigabilityin-fact" test. Waters were considered navigable when they form "by themselves, or by
uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried
on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce
is conducted by water." Id. at 563. The Court in The Montello considered waters to be
navigable if they potentially could be put to public use. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874).
In Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, the Court established the "indelible
navigability" rule, which held that once a waterway is navigable, it is always considered to
be navigable despite any changes in its character. 256 U.S. 113, 123 (1921); see Hoyer, supra
note 84, at 22. The Court in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408
(1940), concluded that navigable waters included those waters that could become navigable
with reasonable improvements. Federal power was not limited by navigation but extended
as far as necessary to meet the needs of commerce, which includes flood protection,
watershed development, and hydroelectric power. Id. at 426. Furthermore, the boundary of
navigable waters was the mean high water line. The courts began to move beyond this
point and permit the regulation of activities above the mean high water line that impacted
navigable waters. Hoyer, supra note 84, at 23-25.
87. In 1960, the Court in United States v. Republic Steel Corp. noted that the navigable
capacity of a waterway refers to more than obstructions to "movements in commerce." 362
U.S. 482 (1960). The Court declared that the RHA must be interpreted "charitably" in light
of the purpose to be served and not with "a narrow, cramped reading." Id. 491. In 1966, in
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966), the Court noted that the RHA
must be interpreted in light of "common sense, precedent, and [its] legislative history." See
also GRAD, supra note 84, at 3-253. One commentator stated that "navigability is now no
more than a base that federal courts feel obligated to touch when clearing the path for the
progress of federal policies or programs." Hoyer, supra note 84, at 23, 25-29. See also Dick

Ratliff, Wetlands Protection Under the Corps of Engineers' New Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction,28
HASTINGS L.J. 223, 226-27 (1976).

88.

James S. Bowman, The Environmental Movement: An Assessment of Ecological Politics,

5 ENVTL. AFF. 649 (1976).
89. Hoyer, supra note 84, at 25-29. See also Charles D. Ablard & Brian Boru O'Neill,

Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments Of
1972: A Corps of Engineers Renaissance, 1 VT. L. REV. 51, 54-58 (1976).
90. Hoyer, supra note 84, at 26-27; 33 C.F.R. 320.4 (2002).
91. 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
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can regulate matters that significantly affect interstate commerce,
including adverse environmental impacts on fish and wildlife and water
quality.92 This authority was reinforced by the Fish and Wildlife
94
Coordination Act 93 and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Congress was also concerned with the Corps' jurisdiction and
responsibility to protect the environment under the RHA. In 1970, the
House Government Operations Committee recommended that the Corps
should consider the effects that the proposed work will have on the
conservation of natural resources, fish and wildlife, air and water
quality, esthetics, scenic view, historic sites, ecology, and other public
interest aspects of the waterway, as well as navigation, when considering
applications for landfills, dredging, and other public works in navigable
waters. 9
President Nixon responded by issuing Executive Order 11574,
which established a permit system to regulate discharges into navigable
waters, including their nonnavigable tributaries.96 However, a federal
district court in Kalur v. Resor97 invalidated the program for regulating
the discharges into nonnavigable tributaries of navigable streams. The
court held that the RHA only allows discharges into navigable waters
with a permit. This decision provided part of the impetus for the
enactment of the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA because all
98
discharging into nonnavigable streams was illegal.
2.1972 FWPCA Amendments
The FWPCA, which was enacted in 1948, was amended five
times prior to the major amendments in 1972. Initially, the FWPCA
focused mainly on state-developed ambient water quality standards that

92. 430 F.2d at 204-05. See also Section 404 Permit Program Survives Legal Challenges, Faces
Congressionaland Administrative Review, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,233, 10,234 (Dec. 1981).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 661 (2000). The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA) mandates
that the Corps consult with the FWS regarding the impact of its actions on fish and wildlife.
The FWCA enunciates a national policy of "recognizing the vital contribution of our
wildlife resources to the Nation, the increasing public interest and significance thereof due
to expansion of our national economy and other factors, and to provide that wildlife
conservation shall receive equal consideration and be coordinated with other features of
water-resource development programs." Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000); Zabel, 430 F.2d at 209.
95. See H.R. REP. No. 91-917, at 1-6 (1970).
96. Executive Order No. 11574, Administration of Refuse Act Permit Program, 35 Fed.
Reg. 19,627 (Dec. 23, 1970).
97. 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
98. GRAD, supra note 84, at 3-354, 3-255; Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental
Tension, and a Callfor Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 695, 700-02 (1989).
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were only applicable to interstate navigable waters." There were many
problems with the water quality approach, so Congress changed the
thrust of the FWPCA in 1972. Water quality standards were
1
The
supplemented by federal point-source effluents limitations.
aspirational goals of the FWPCA were fishable and swimable waters by
1983 and zero discharges by 1985.01 The federal regulation of dredge and
fill discharges was addressed in section 404, which granted broad federal
jurisdiction.
The Senate Committee on Public Works reported a bill in 1971
that extended federal jurisdiction to "the navigable waters of the United
States, portions thereof, and includes the territorial seas and the Great
Lakes. " l'° The Committee recognized that the narrow interpretation of
interstate waters limited the implementation of the 1965 act. The
Committee stressed that "water moves in hydrological cycles and.. .the
discharge of pollutants [must] be controlled at the source."'0 The Senate
bill did not contain a specific provision regarding dredge and fill
activities.
The House Committee on Public Works reported a bill in 1972
but was reluctant to define the term navigable waters, fearing "that any
interpretation would be read narrowly, [which] is not the Committee's
intent."1" The Committee emphasized that "the term navigable waters be
given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered
by agency determinations which have been made or may be made for
administrative purposes."'05 The House bill contained section 404, which
granted the Corps jurisdiction over the discharge of dredge and fill
materials into navigable waters."'
The conference committee followed the House bill and granted
the Corps jurisdiction to regulate the discharge of dredge and fill
99. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 2 (1971), cited in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1420 (1973)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972].
100. Robin Kundis Craig, Navigating Federalism: The Missing Statutory Analysis in Solid
Waste Agency, 31 ENWL. L. REP. 10,508, 10,509 (2001).
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
102. William Eskridge points out that committee reports are the most authoritative
source of legislative history because they reflect the understanding of those who were
involved in the drafting and study of the proposals. The committee reports show areas of
agreement. The conference committee report shows the areas of disagreement and their
resolution. Eskridge, supranote 45, at 637. See also Tiefer, supra note 53, at 251-54.
103. Senate Committee on Public Works, Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1971, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1971), cited in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972,
supra note 99, at 1495.
104. House Committee on Public Works, Federal Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1972), cited in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 99, at 764.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 168-69, cited in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 99, at 855-57.
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material into navigable waters. The EPA was granted concurrent
jurisdiction to develop disposal site guidelines and to veto permits that
"will adversely affect municipal water supplies, shellfish
beds and
fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or
recreation areas. " 107
The conference committee defined navigable waters as "the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,"'m which was
identical to the definition in the House bill except for the omission of the
word "navigable." 9 This means that the deletion was intentional. '" The
conferees intended "that the term 'navigable waters' be given the
broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency
determinations which have been made or may be made for
administrative purposes.""' Since the agency determinations referred to
by the committee related to "navigability," this demonstrated the
conference committee's intent to drop "navigability" as the basis for
federal jurisdiction."2
There were statements on the floor of the Senate and House
regarding the conference report. 3 Senator Muskie, a sponsor of the bill
and conferee, declared that the provisions should be "construed
broadly." Nevertheless, he noted that navigable waters are "navigable in
fact," which means they form "a continuing highway over which
commerce is or may be carried on...1 Representative Dingell stated
that the conference committee defined "the term navigable waters
broadly for water quality purposes."' Navigable waters encompassed
"all the waters of the U.S. in a geographic sense,"1 6 not a technical sense.
The waterway must only serve "as a link in the chain of commerce

107. Conference Committee, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
SEN. REP. No. 92-1236, at 141-42 (1972), cited in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 99, at
324-26.
108. Id. at 143-44, cited in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 99, at 326-27.
109. Robert Zener, The Federal law of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 682, 689-90, n.53 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G.P. Guilbert eds., 1974) (citing
H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., § 502(8) (1972)).
110. Id.
111. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 99, at 327.
112. Zener, supra note 109, at 690.
113. William Eskridge points out that the statements of sponsors and floor managers
are particularly important because they are "most likely to know what the proposed
legislation is all about, and other Members can be expected to pay special heed to their
characterizations of the legislation." Eskridge, supra note 45, at 638. The statements of other
legislators on the floor, while less authoritative, show "the general assumptions made at
the time a law was enacted." Id. at 639.
114. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, supra note 99, at 178.
115. Id. at 250.
116. Id.
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Representative Dingell declared that "no longer
among the States...
are old, narrow definitions of navigability, as determined by the Corps of
118
Engineers, going to govern matters covered by this bill."
Senator Muskie's statement in 1972 was ambivalent. He assumed
a broad definition of navigable waters but continued to stress a nexus to
navigable water."9 Nevertheless, the plain meaning of the statute and the
conference committee report are more authoritative than the individual
2°
Representative Dingell's
views of a particular congressperson.'
statement more accurately reflected the scope of federal jurisdiction.
2
Furthermore, later statements by both Senator Muskie1 ' and
Representative Dingell"n propounded the broadest possible definition for
navigable waters, clearing up any ambiguities.
The amendments to the FWPCA in 1972 were designed to
restore the nation's water quality and prevent pollution. Congress
recognized that pollution was a national problem that required a
national solution. Congress was concerned with the loss of fisheries and
recreational values, unfair interstate competition, interstate pollution,
23
and the disruption of ecosystems. Federal jurisdiction was expanded to
"the waters of the U.S" and given "the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation." 24 Federal jurisdiction was dependent on the commerce
clause, not the water's navigability. At the time, the courts recognized
l2
virtually unlimited federal commerce clause authority.1
3. 1977 Clean Water Act (CWA)
Despite the broad jurisdiction granted in the 1972 amendments
to the FWPCA, the Corps continued to restrict its authority to waters
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Senator Muskie's statement was taken verbatim from the legislative history of the
vessel sewage provision of the 1970 Amendments to the FWPCA, a provision that applied
to the "navigable waters of the United States" in the traditional sense of the term. 116 Cong.
Rec. 8985 (1970). See Zener, supra note 109, at 690 n.56.
120. Eskridge, supra note 45, at 637. See also Michael C. Blumm, Wetlands Preservation,
Fish and Wildlife Protection,and 404 Regulation: A Response, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 469
(1983).
121. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, A CONTINUATION OF
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 869 (1978) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977].
122. During the floor debates on the Clean Water Act of 1977, Rep. Dingell declared that
the 1977 amendments represented a retreat from the 1972 CWA. He was opposed to
granting the states jurisdiction over phase II and I waters because the states were too
willing to develop their wetlands. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 121, at 1390.
123. Zener, supra note 109, at 692.
124. Id. at 690,692 n.63.
125. Zener, supra note 109, at 692-93; Charles W. Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water
PollutionControl Act of 1972, 77 DICK. L. REV. 459,466 (1973).
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navigable in fact. This generated institutional conflict. Positive political
theory posits that the governmental institutions act as rational actors and
compete with each other to have their policy preferences prevail. The
'
competing players constantly signal each other regarding their intent. 6
There was conflict within the executive branch. The EPA
asserted jurisdiction over wetlands and declared that the conference
committee deleted navigation from the definition of navigable waters to
free pollution control from narrow jurisdictional boundaries. All that
was required was a connection to interstate commerce, not to

navigation. 127
Congress was critical of the Corps' narrow interpretation. The
House Committee on Government Operations advocated broader
jurisdiction. 128 The federal courts also adopted a more expansive view of
the Corps jurisdiction. 29 Several decisions required dredge and fill
permits for activities on nonadjacent wetlands that had a hydrological
connection to navigable waters.13° In 1975, a federal district court
invalidated the Corps regulation 3' and held that Congress intended to
assert federal jurisdiction over waters to the maximum extent possible
under the Commerce Clause.32
The Corps responded by issuing interim regulations that
asserted jurisdiction over different classes of water in a three-phase
126. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 75 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreward: Positive Political Theory in
the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462 (1992); Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial
Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757

(1996).
127. Comprehensive Wetlands Protection: One Step Closer to Full Implementation of 404 of
FWPCA, 5 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,099, 10,100-01 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 93-1396, at 24 (1974); Environmental Protection Agency, Part 230-Navigable Waters, Discharge of Dredged or Fill
Material, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,297-98 (Sept. 5, 1975).
128. H. REP. No. 93-1396, at 14-27.
129. Representative Harsha, one of the 1972 conferees, declared that "[tihe courts did
not adjudicate a new definition of navigable waters... .The Court has upheld our position
on that. It did not redefine navigable waters." See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note
121, at 1390.
130. See United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (permitting federal
regulation of activities above the mean high water line that pollute the waters of the United
States); United States v. Ashland Oil &Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (involving
the discharges of oil into a tertiary tributary to navigable U.S. waters); P.F.Z. Props. v.
Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370, 1381 (D.D.C. 1975) and Leslie Salt v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292,
1296-97 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (each involving discharges of dredge and fill material into navigable waters of the United States).
131. NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1975). Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at
705-06. Ablard & O'Neill, supra note 89, at 61-64. Joanne M. Frasca, Federal Control Over

Wetlands: The Effectiveness of Corps Regulation Under Section 404 of FWPCA, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 505 (1975).

132.

Callaway, 524 F.2d at 686.
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process."n In phase I, the Corps would regulate discharges into coastal
waters and wetlands, navigable rivers, lakes, streams, and contiguous
and adjacent wetlands. In phase II, discharges into tributaries of
navigable waters and their contiguous wetlands would be controlled. In
phase III, discharges into all U.S. waters, including isolated waters that
substantially affect interstate commerce, would be regulated. No section
404 permit would be approved until the state provided a water quality
certification pursuant to section 401.1'4
The Corps' interim regulations generated harsh criticism. Some
argued that the expansion of jurisdiction would overburden the Corps
and intrude on state and local land use authority.ln An unsuccessful suit
was brought, challenging the Corps' broadened jurisdiction." Twenty
senators wrote to President Ford, requesting a delay in the
implementation of phases IIand II.137 In July 1976, President Ford
granted the request and suspended implementation of phase II while
Congress considered the issue.'3
There was an unsuccessful attempt to amend the FWPCA and
39
resolve the jurisdictional dispute in 1976.' The House passed
amendments that limited the Corps' jurisdiction to "navigable waters
and their adjacent wetlands." '0 The Senate did not follow the House
approach.1 4 1 The Senate restricted the Corps' exclusive jurisdiction to
traditional navigable waters pursuant to the RHA but allowed the states
to assume control over dredge and fill activities in nontraditional

133. Corps of Engineers, Dept. of Army, Part 209-Administrative Procedure, Permits
for Activities in Navigable Waters and Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,326 (July 25,
1975).
134. Id.; see also Comment: Corps Issues Interim Rules for Discharges of Dredge and Fill
Materials,5 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,143 (1975).
135. This fear was highly exaggerated. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 121, at
1386-89 (statement of Rep. Edgar); Environmental Groups Call Corps Permits Statement
Deliberately Misleading, 6 ENvT. REP. (BNA) 145 (1975); Daniel E. Boxer, Every Pond and
Puddle-or,How Far Can the Army Corps Stretch the Intent of Congress, 9 NAT. RES. LAW. 467
(1976).
136. Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114 (D. Wyo. 1977).
137. Senators Plan to Ask President to Halt Phase II Dredge Fill Rules, 7 ENVT. REP. (BNA)
285 (1976).
138. Ford Halts Corps Phase II Rules: Senate Public Works Sets Hearings, 7 ENVT. REP.
(BNA) 435-36. James R. Curtis, Note, The Clean Water of 1977: Midcourse Corrections in the
Section 404 Program,57 NEB. L. REV. 1092, 1105-06 (1978).
139. Lee Evan Caplin, Is Congress ProtectingOur Water? The Controversy Over Section 404,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445 (1977).
140. The historic test of navigability, that past use makes the waterway always
navigable, was eliminated. Adjacent wetlands only included freshwater wetlands
contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters. Freshwater wetlands not contiguous or
adjacent to other navigable waters were omitted. Id. at 460-66.
141. Id. at 479-89.
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navigable waters (phase II and III waters) with EPA authorization.' 42
Nevertheless, the conferees could not reach an agreement over the
43
Corps' section 404 jurisdiction, so the amendments were not enacted.
In 1977, Congress again considered amendments to the FWPCA.
The House Public Works Committee reported a bill that was similar to
the 1976 House measure.1 " Navigable waters were limited to waters
navigable in fact up to the mean high water level and their adjacent
wetlands. Historic navigable waters were excluded. The discharge of
dredge and fill into nonnavigable waters and adjacent wetlands could be
regulated by the Corps and states through voluntary agreements. The
committee was critical of the court's expansion of navigable waters and
the Corps' regulations.'"
The House bill was criticized for placing 98 percent of the
nation's stream miles and 80 percent of the nation's wetlands beyond
federal jurisdiction. There was fear that loopholes would allow the
dumping of toxic wastes into nonnavigable waters and adjacent
wetlands. There were doubts that the states could implement dredge and
fill programs. Problems with point source discharges and enforcement
actions were envisioned. Both the Corps and the EPA opposed the
House bill."
The Senate Public Works Committee rejected the House
approach.4 7 The committee felt that the Corps' jurisdiction could not be
limited to traditional navigable waters, so there would be no redefinition
of navigable waters. The Senate bill "intends to ensure continued
protection of all the Nation's waters, but allows States to assume the
primary responsibility for protecting those lakes, rivers, streams,
swamps, marshes, and other portions of the navigable waters outside the
Corps program in the so-called phase I waters."'" The Corps would
continue to control the discharge of dredge and fill material into
nontraditional navigable waters until state programs were approved.'"
During the Senate debates, there was recognition of the
importance of protecting wetlands,'"° as well as efforts to amend section
142. Id.
143. Id. at 489-90.
144. H.R. REP. No. 95-139 (1975), cited in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 121, at
1195.
145. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supranote 121, at 1215-20.
146. Comment: The Move to Amend § 404 of FWPCA: House Passes Bill Limiting Federal
Authority Over Dredgeand Fill Activities, 7 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,082, 10,083 (1977).
147. S. REP. No. 95-370 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 121, at
633.
148. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 121, at 708.
149. Id.
150. Senator Stafford stated, "the section 404 process is an essential tool...
Without it,
critical aquatic areas... [that] are essential to the preservation of migratory and resident fish,
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404. Senator Bentsen offered an amendment that would restrict the
Corps' jurisdiction to the parameters of the House bill. Senator Bentsen
argued that the delegation of the authority to the states did not reduce
the scope of section 404. If a state did not assume responsibility, the
Corps would continue to regulate the dredge and fill discharges into the
151
waters of the United States. The Bentsen amendment was criticized on
3
52
the floor by Senators Baker' and Muskie, 1 both 1972 conferees on the
FWPCA, and was defeated by a vote of 45 to51. All of the 1972 conferees
remaining in the Senate voted against the amendment: Senators Baker,
m
Muskie, Randolph, Eagleton, and Bayh.'
The conference committee, which was comprised of seven 1972
56
conferees," adopted the Senate version. There was no change in the
definition of navigable waters. States were permitted to assume
jurisdiction over dredge and fill discharges in nontraditional navigable7
waters (phase II and III waters) after EPA approval of their programs.
The discharge of dredge and fill material from normal farming,
silviculture, and ranching, as well as that from federal projects
was exempted from section 404
authorized by Congress,'

bird and other animal populations, might otherwise be irrevocably destroyed." Id. at 881.
Senator Randolph, a 1972 conferee, characterized the bill as "a realistic and workable way
of protecting our Nation's waterways from contamination by the disposal of dredged and
fill materials. The section of the CWA of 1977 is similar to that in last years bill." Id. at 897.
151. Id. at 901-10.
152. Senator Baker stated that "[a] fundamental element of the Water Act is broad
jurisdiction over water for pollution control purposes... Comprehensive jurisdiction is
necessary not to protect the natural environment but also to avoid creating unfair
competition." Id. at 920-21.
153. Senator Muskie noted that "the systematic destruction of the Nation's wetlands is
causing serious, permanent ecological damage. The wetlands.. .are the Nation's most
biologically active areas.. .they also provide nesting areas for myriad of species of birds and
wildlife." Id. at 869.
154. Id. at 947. Senators Boggs and Cooper were no longer in the Senate.
155. The 1977 conference committee consisted of seven members from the 1972
conference committee: Senators Baker, Muskie, and Randolph and Representatives
Johnson, Roe, Harsha, and Clausen.
156. H.R. REP. No. 95-830 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 121,
at 185.
157. 33 U.S.C. 1344(g) (2000); see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 121, at 22129, 284-89. For a debate on Section 404, see Lance D. Wood, The Forum's Proposal to Delegate
Section 404 to the States: A Bad Dealfor Wetlands, NATL WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), July-Aug. 1989, at 2; Thomas H. Kean, A Reply to Mr. Wood, NATIONAL
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 3; Lance D.
Wood, Section 404 Delegation: A Rebuttal to Governor Kean, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl.
Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 2; Thomas J. Dawson, States Need
Commitment, Leadership, and Backbone, Not Section 404, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 4.
158. 33 U.S.C. 1344(r) (2000).
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requirements."' Funds were authorized for a national wetlands
inventory.'1 °
On December 15, 1977, Congress passed the bill, which is known
as the Clean Water Act. President Carter signed the bill, stating, "the
Nation's wetlands will continue to be protected under a framework
which is workable and which shares responsibilities with the States." 16'
The Court in SWANCC adopted a very constrained view of the
1977 legislative history. 62 The Court declared that it is dangerous to base
statutory interpretation on rejected congressional proposals because
there are many reasons for their demise.1'' Instead, the Court determined
that the federal government had not shown that failure to constrain the
Corps' jurisdiction indicated congressional acceptance of the migratory
bird rule. The debates in Congress only focused on the extent of the
Corps' jurisdiction and were only concerned with wetland preservation.
There was nothing to indicate that the Corps' jurisdiction extended
beyond adjacent wetlands, as upheld in Riverside Bayview Homes.'TM
The Court's view on this matter was dubious. Rejected proposals
are important because they show that Congress considered the issue and
discarded the policy proposal.
Congress, in 1977, disdained the
restriction of the Corps' jurisdiction upheld in SWANCC. The House bill
and the Bentsen amendment, which were designed to limit the Corps'
jurisdiction to traditional navigable waters, were rejected. Statements by
several of the 1972 conferees indicated that such a restriction was not
consistent with legislative intent in 1972. Furthermore, section 4 04 (g) was
enacted, which specifically recognized federal jurisdiction over waters
"other than" traditional navigable waters.
The Court attached great significance to the 1977 amendments in
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.166 The Court found the
Corps' regulatory definition reasonable in light of the language, policies,
and legislative history of the CWA, which reflected clear congressional
intent to extend federal jurisdiction beyond traditional navigable
159. 33 U.S.C. 1344(f) (2000).
160. 33 U.S.C. 1288(4) (B)(v) (2000).
161. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supra note 121, at 185. Earlier President Carter issued
Executive Order 11990, which instructed federal agencies "to minimize the destruction,
loss
or degradation of wetlands, and to preserve and enhance the nature and beneficial values
of wetlands in carrying the agency's responsibilities..." Exec. Order No. 11990, 42 Fed. Reg.
26,961 (May 24, 1977).
162. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675,681-82 (2001).
163. Id., citing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
164. SWANCC, 121 S.Ct. at 681-83, citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136 (1985).
165. Eskridge, supra note 45, at 638-39.
166. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 121.
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waters." 7 Regarding the legislative history, the Court determined that the
unsuccessful efforts to restrict the Corps regulatory definition during the
enactment of the 1977 amendments were significant and demonstrated
8
congressional approval of the Corps' action.
The 1977 amendments were subsequent legislative history,
which is generally considered less authoritative because it is not
indicative of the intent and purpose of the original legislature. However,
the Court at times relies on subsequent legislative history "when the
69
precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure." The original intent
of Congress in 1972 was clear and was simply reinforced by the 1977
amendments. Furthermore, many of the same congresspersons who
were conferees in both the 1972 and 1977 FWPCA amendments stated
that broad federal jurisdiction was assumed in the 1972 FWPCA
amendments.
The Court in SWANCC also neglected the 1988 Water Resources
Development Act," which instructed the Corps to consult with the EPA
and consider the impacts on Newark Valley Aquifer before issuing any
section 404 permit at the SWANCC site in Bartlett, Illinois. The EPA
initially found that there were no risks but later changed its position.
congressional approval of the Corps'
This provision indicates
7
jurisdiction over the site.1 '
C. Purposes
The court's statutory interpretation must also be guided by the
legislative purpose, which is the ultimate motive of the legislature.'7 The
legislative purpose is the best justification that can be attributed to the
statute in terms of its relationship with the set of legal norms operating
at the time of the court's decision. The legislative purpose, which is more
abstract than intention, helps the court to determine the legislative
intent, directs the court when the intent has not been manifested, and
allows the court to keep the statute in harmony with contemporary
values.'73
167. Id. at 137-38.
168. Id. at 137, citing Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-601 (1983);
United States. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979).
169. Eskridge, supra note 45, at 635-36, 640.
170. Water Resources Development Act, Pub. L. No. 100-676, 102 Stat. 4012 (1988)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2312 et seq. (2000)).
171. Brief for the Respondents Village of Bartlett and Citizens Against the Balefill at 16
n.6, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
172. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (1994); DICKERSON, supra note 72, at 86-102.

173. HART & SACKS, supra note 172, at 1374-80; Vincent A. Welman, Dworkin and the
Legal Process Tradition:The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 AZ. L. REV. 413, 463 (1987).
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Critics argue that reliance on the legislative purposes is
indeterminate for the following reasons: (1) since the legislative purposes
are stated in general terms, the court is granted too much discretion; (2) a
statute reflects many different purposes because it must be acceptable to
a wide range of interests in order to be enacted; (3) focusing on the
purposes ignores the statutory text; and (4) the optimistic assumptions
regarding purposeful rational legislative processes are naive.'7
Hart and Sacks address this criticism and assert that the
attribution of purpose does not grant the court unbridled discretion. The
court is constrained by the words of the statute, which are enacted into
law. The court must be careful not to give the words "a meaning that
they will not bear."" Words are not empty vessels into which the court
pours meaning but have a dual role "as guides in the attribution of
general purpose and as factors limiting the particular meanings that can
properly be attributed."176 The words must not be given "a meaning
which would violate any established policy of clear statement."77 The
court must "try to put itself in... the position of the legislature which
enacted the measure" and assume that the "legislature was made up of
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably." 78 The
court asks, "why would reasonable men, confronted with the law as it
was, have enacted this new law to replace it." 79 The court looks for the
"mischief" in the prior statute and "the true reason of the remedy"
provided by the new statute.'8 The legislative history must be examined
"for the light it throws on the general purpose." 8'
The Court in SWANCC never addressed, but undermined, the
purposes of the CWA. The declared purpose of the CWA is "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters." 82 The House Public Works Committee explained that
integrity means "a condition in which the natural structure and function
174. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, supra note 55, at
334-38; William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the
Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691, 704-09 (1987).
175. HART & SACKS, supra note 172, at 1374-76.
176. Id. at 1375.
177. Id. at 1374.
178. Id. at 1378.
179. Id.
180. HART & SACKS, supra note 172, at 1378.
181. Id. at 1379-80. See also Breyer, supranote 77, at 853-56; Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest-Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 261-67 (1986). Farber and Frickey note that "Hart and Sacks are not so
much Panglossian empiricists as savvy normativists-crafters of assumptions that provide
useful judicial and administrative side-constraints upon the less attractive features of
politics." Farber & Frickey, supra note 126, at 475.
182. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). See also Blumm, supra note 120, at 475-76.
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1
of the ecosystems is maintained." ' Natural means "that condition in
existence before the activities of man invoked perturbations which
prevented the system from returning to its original state of
equilibrium." 18 Any manmade change to the system "which overtaxes
the ability of nature to restore conditions to natural or original is an
"1
unacceptable perturbation. 8 Ecosystems are dynamic and undergo
change overtime. Natural ecosystems are "capable of preserving
themselves at levels believed to have existed before irreversible
perturbations caused by man's activities."8
To accomplish these objectives, the CWA seeks to end discharges
into U.S. waters by 1985 and achieve interim water quality that provides
for "the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
7
provides for recreation in and on the water" by 198328 The CWA is
concerned with pollution and ecological balance, not with navigation or
the regulation of interstate transport.
If section 404 is limited to navigable waters, there will be gaps in
the comprehensive statutory scheme. Section 404 protects against dredge
spoils, which contain heavy toxic metals, and fill materials, that destroy
the waters and wetlands. Many isolated waters and wetlands are
hydrologically connected to navigable waters through groundwater and
flooding, so adverse impacts cannot be constrained.'8 Furthermore,
many isolated waters and wetlands, which are ecologically connected to
navigable waters, will be left unprotected. The discharge of dredge and
fill material into these waters will jeopardize fish and wildlife and upset
aquatic ecosystems, which will have interstate impacts.8 For example,
the destruction of prairie potholes in the northern Great Plains or the
playa lakes of the Great Basin will have adverse effects on the migratory
shorebirds that are part of the ecological balance at other wetland sites
19°
on the east and west coasts.

183. See LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY 1972, supra note 99, at 763.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 764.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1, 30-31
(1993). Wetlands are dynamic water systems that are linked to other aquatic systems. Jon
A. Kusler, et al., Wetlands, Sci. AM., Jan. 1994, at 68-70. Numerous water basins and water
bodies overlap state boundaries and are affected by the destruction of wetlands in one
state. Brief of the States of California et al. at 21-22, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178). See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 767-68 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing the effect of wetlands disturbance on the water quality of the lake).
189. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977, supranote 121, at 1397-98.
190. Houck & Rolland, supra note 24, at 1247. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 17. See also Laura
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The protection of isolated waters and wetlands, which
"represent an ecosystem of unique and major importance," 9'
realizes the
environmental goals of the CWA. Isolated waters and wetlands serve as
habitat for mammals, fish, and waterfowl. 92 They are the principal
breeding grounds for migratory birds and serve as a habitat oasis in dry
regions during migration. Isolated waters and wetlands help prevent
erosion, slow runoff, and curtail flooding by holding water. Isolated
waters and wetlands filter out pollutants and restore the quality of
surface and ground water. Isolated waters and wetlands are a vital link
in the aquatic food chain. The plant life provides food for marine and
freshwater animals. Half of the fish and shellfish reside in wetlands
during part of their life. 93 Recognizing these values, the federal
government has adopted a longstanding policy of protecting and
preserving wetlands.

H. Kolsoff, Comment, Tragedy of the Kesterson Reservoir: Death of a Wildlife Refuge Illustrates
Failingsof Water Law, 15 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,386 (1985).
191. Environmental Protection Agency, Protection of Nation's Wetlands, 38 Fed. Reg.
10,699, 10,834 (May 2, 1973).
192. Small wetlands are important for "maintaining the biodiversity of a number of
plant and animal species. Furthermore, healthy populations of many species depend on not
just a single wetland but a landscape densely covered by a variety of wetlands." Raymond
D. Semlitsch, Size Does Matter: The Value of Small Isolated Wetlands, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL.
(Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 5.
193. Semlitsch, supra note 192, at 5; Environmental Protection Agency, Protection of
Nation's Wetlands, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,834-35 (May 2, 1973); Eric W. Nagle, Wetlands Protection
or the Neglected Child of CWA: A Proposalfor Shared Custody of Section 404, 7 VA. J. NAT. RES.
L. 381, 384-89 (1988); Bhavani Prasad V. Nerikar, This Wetland Is Your Land, This Wetland Is
My Land: Section 404 of the CWA and Its Implications on the Private Development of Wetlands, 4
ADMIN. L.J. 197,202-07 (1990).
194. In the Water Bank Act, Congress declared that
it is in the public interest to preserve, restore, and improve wetlands of the
Nations, and thereby to conserve surface waters, to preserve and improve
habitat for migratory waterfowl and other wildlife resources... .The
Secretary of Agriculture... is authorized and directed to formulate and
carry out a continuous program to prevent the serious loss of wetlands,
and to preserve, restore and improve such lands...
Water Bank Act, 16 U.S.C.§ 1301 (2000).
In the North American Wetlands Conservation Act, Congress stated,
The purposes of this chapter are to encourage partnership among public
agencies and other interests- 1) to protect, enhance, restore, and manage
an appropriate distribution and diversity of wetland ecosystems and other
habitats for migratory birds and other fish and wildlife in North America;
2) to maintain current or improved distributions of migratory bird
populations; and 3) to sustain an abundance of waterfowl and other
migratory birds consistent with the goals of the North American
Waterfowl Management Plan and the international obligations contained
in the migratory bird treaties and conventions and other agreements with
Canada, Mexico, and other countries.
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The Supreme Court in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., focusing on the statutory purposes, noted that the CWA
"constituted a comprehensive legislative attempt" to restore and
95
The regulation of
maintain "the integrity of the Nation's waters."
polluting activities "must focus on all waters that together form the
entire aquatic system." Water moves in hydrologic cycles, so that
pollution in any part of the system "will affect the water quality of the
'96
other waters within the aquatic system. As a result, "Congress chose
'
to define the waters covered by the Act broadly."' 7The Court concluded
that "Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been
placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes
and to exercise its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least
some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical
198
Furthermore, the Court specifically
understanding of the term."
recognized the ecological benefits of protecting adjacent wetlands.'9
Isolated waters and wetlands provide the same benefits.
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: STEP-TWO
Chevron holds that if Congress has not addressed the issue, the
0
court can "not simply impose its own construction on the statute." ' The
court must move to the second step and determine "whether the
22
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
The court does not have to conclude that the agency's construction is
"the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the
construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the
2
question had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Instead, the court must
defer to "a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of the
agency." 2°4
Judges are admonished not to read their policy preferences into
the law because they lack expertise and are not accountable to the
North American Wetlands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.§ 4401 (2000). See also infra notes 471483.

195.

474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985).

196. Id.
197. Id. at 133.
198. Id. at 132. The Court did, however, decide not "to address the question of the
authority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not
adjacent to bodies of open water." Id. at 131 n.8.
199. Id. at 133-35.
200. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 132-35 (1985).
201. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,843 (1984).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 843 n.11.
204. Id. at 844.
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electorate. Congress delegated power to the agency, which can "properly
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform
its judgments. "20 The President, who has the constitutional responsibility
to faithfully execute the law, 20' makes policy choices that "resolve the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with
2°7
the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities."
Chevron is applauded for decreasing judicial review.2 Agencies
will be "encouraged to take more responsibility for interpreting the
statutes they implement." 209 Litigants will "make their best arguments,
clearly and aggressively, before the agency rather than waiting for the
main event in the courthouse." 210 Agencies will have more flexibility to
change their statutory interpretation "in light of new scientific,
industrial, or other developments or even because a recently elected
administration has a new regulatory program." 21' The development of
national policy will be facilitated by precluding different circuit courts
from rendering different decisions on the same issues, preventing the
212
"balkanization of federal law."
Chevron has not been followed consistently by the courts.1 3 To
alleviate this problem, Professor Merrill suggests that the courts should
treat executive decisions like judicial precedents and accord them
discretionary deference. The courts should ask three questions: (1) Is
there an executive precedent? (2) How strong is the executive precedent?
205. Id. at 865-66.
206. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
3.
207. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
208. For criticism of Chevron, see Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal,
101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 466-69, 488-99 (1987); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 478-88 (1989); Alfred
Aman, Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the
AdministrativePresidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1228-35 (1988).
209. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. REG. 283, 311
(1986).
210. Id.
211. Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretationof Statutes: An Analysis of
Chevron's Two Step, 2 ADM. L.J. 255, 259 (1988).
212. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred and Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1122 (1987).
213. From 1984 through 1990, the Court only invoked Chevron in approximately onethird of the appropriate circumstances. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 981 (1992); Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, supra note 50, at 355-63. Other courts have manifested the same ambivalence. Id.
See also Richard C. Pierce, Two Problemsin Administrative Law: Political Polarityon the District
of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 312-13
n.82; Strauss, supra note 212, at 1118-19; Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron
Station: An EmpiricalStudy of FederalAdministrativeLaw, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1118-19 (1990).
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214
and (3) Does independent judicial review compel a different result?
The courts should uphold agency decisions with strong precedents that
15
carry out congressional intent.
The Court in SWANCC refused to defer to the Corps' statutory
interpretation absent clear direction in the CWA because the Corps'
interpretation "raised significant constitutional and federalism
questions." 216 The Court's reliance on the canons of statutory
interpretation, the dear statement rule, and avoidance of constitutional
doubt was questionable.
Canons are flawed for several reasons. First, canons are not
policy neutral. They provide contradictory rules, which a judge can
choose to support her view of the case. Karl Llewellyn noted that "there
21 8
are two opposing canons on almost every point." Second, canons pose
problems as guides to meaning. Canons are presumptions about
legislative intent. There is little evidence that legislators are aware of the
canons of statutory interpretation. Canons shift the burden of proof and
force the legislature to overcome the judicial presumption, rather than
9
requiring the judge to search for meaning." The best indications of
legislative intent are not found in the canons but in the legislative
history.'m
2
The strong clear statement rule has many drawbacks. 21First, it
allows the court to ignore clear signals in the legislative history and
m
statutory purposes and undermines legislative bargains. Second, it
enables the court to advance its ideological agenda without directly
antagonizing Congress.m Third, it is based on an unrealistic view of the
legislative process. Reaching agreement in Congress is difficult, so it is
often necessary to fashion the statutory language in general terms and

214. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,supra note 213, at 1003-12.
215. Id. See also David M. Forman, Economic Development Versus Environmental Protection:
Executive Oversight and the Judicial Review of Wetland Policy, 15 HAwAII L. REV. 23, 31-36
(1993).
216. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675,683-84 (2001).
217. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement
Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593,595-96 (1992).
218. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
219. Mikva & Lane, supra note 52, at 129. Breyer, supra note 77, at 869-74.
220. The canon of statutory construction is "a rule used in construing legal instruments,
especially contracts and statutes." BLACK's LAw DICIONARY 198 (7th ed. 1999). The
legislative history is "the background and events leading to the enactment of a statute,
including hearings, committee reports, and floor debates." Id. at 911.
221. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 217, at 595-98.
222. Id.; Healy, supra note 7, at 10,940.
223. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Forward:Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 85 (1994).
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delegate implementing authority to the administrative agency.7 Fourth,
it constitutes the classic "bait-and-switch." Congress enacts statutes with
presumptions about the interpretative regime. When the court changes
the interpretative regime, it undermines legislative intent.2 Fifth, it
makes the delegation of authority to an administrative agency difficult
and encumbers the agency's ability to act.226 Finally, it frustrates Chevron,
which presumes the supremacy of the administrative agency's statutory
interpretation in the presence of congressional doubt.22 7
The avoidance of constitutional doubt canon poses constitutional
difficulties.m The avoidance canon, which is based on legislative
supremacy,2 posits that when alternative interpretations of a statute are
possible, the court must choose the one that precludes constitutional
invalidity.2-° The canon, however, presents problems with the
constitutional separation of powers. First, the canon does not foster
legislative supremacy. Congress might want to push the constitutional
parameters when enacting a statute and generate a constitutional
determination.3 1 By avoiding a constitutional determination, the court
may interpret the statute in a manner that is inconsistent with the text,
intent, and purposes of the statute.' The Court noted that the canon is
not "a license for the judiciary to rewrite the language enacted by the
224.

Supreme Court-LeadingCases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 528, 536-37 (2001).

225. Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 223, at 85; Healy, supra note 7, at 10,939 n.108.
226. Healy, supra note 7, at 10,940-41.
227. Judge Mikva observed "that when Congress has not given a clear command, we
presume that it has accorded discretion to the agency to clarify any ambiguities in the
statute it administers. In requiring the agency to justify its regulation by reference to such a
clear command, the majority confounds its role. Ties are supposed to go to the dealer under
Chevron." Sweethome Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463,
1475 (1995) (Mikva, J., dissenting).

228.

William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three Branch Problem, 86

CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts:
The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.

REV. 1 (1996); Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly on

ConstitutionalInterpretation,66 CWu.-KENT L. REV. 481 (1990).
229. The justifications for the canon are
(1) the delicacy and (2) finality of judicial review of legislative acts; (3) the
limitations on authority and jurisdiction of federal courts; (4) the
"paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system";
(5)
separation of powers concerns raised by ruling on the acts of coequal
branches; and (6) the need to show respect for other branches.
Kloppenberg, supra note 228, at 13-14.
230. The Court noted that it has long been an axiom of statutory interpretation that
"where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,575 (1988).
231. Kelley, supra note 228, at 84647.
232. Id.
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legislature."'- Second, the avoidance canon interferes with the Executive
Branch's Article H responsibility to insure the faithful execution of the
law. Chevron holds that Congress delegated authority to democratically
accountable expert agencies to fill in the gaps of a statute. The avoidance
canon undermines the agency's implementation of the statute. Without
declaring the agency action unconstitutional, the court simply substitutes
its view on policy for that of the agency.23 Finally, the avoidance canon
precludes judicial review, yet the court is still engaged in "'quasiconstitutional lawmaking' and developing 'phantom constitutional
norms."'"" This muddles the constitutional dialogue with other political
actors. 2?
The Court's invocation of the clear statement rule in SWANCC
ignored important signals in the legislative history and statutory
purposes, which clearly indicated broad federal jurisdiction. The Court's
utilization of the canon of constitutional doubt interfered with the
implementation of the CWA and undermined Chevron. The Court
ignored strong executive precedent. The Corps' assertion of jurisdiction
over waters having a substantial effect on interstate commerce, which
was consistent with congressional intent, had been followed for 26 years.
The migratory bird rule had been in effect for 15 years, adhered to by
three administrations, and upheld by most courts. There was no reason
to change the policy. Neither the Executive Branch nor Congress was
seeking such change. The Court simply substituted its views on policy
for those of the Corps.
A. The History of the Migratory Bird Rule
After the enactment of the FWPCA amendments in 1972, the
Corps continued to limit its jurisdiction to navigable waters up to the
mean high waterline. 7 The federal courts, however, supported a broader
233. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985); United States v. Monsanto, 491
U.S. 600,611 (1989).
234. Kelley, supra note 228, at 869-91.
235. Kloppenberg, supranote 228, at 16-17; Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 217, at 612-15.
236. Kloppenberg, supra note 228, at 17-24; Marshall, supra note 228, at 484-86.
237. Corps of Engineers, Dep't of Army, Part 209-Administrative Procedure, Definition
of Navigable Waters of the United States, 37 Fed. Reg. 17,807, 18,289 (Sept. 9, 1972); Corps
of Engineers, Dep't of Army, 33 CFR Part 209, Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters
and Ocean Waters, 38 Fed. Reg. 11,959, at 12,217, 12,218 (May 10, 1973); Corps of Engineers,
Dep't of Army, Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters and Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg.
11,855, 12,115 (Apr. 3, 1974); Blumm, supra note 120, at 477-78; Nagle, supranote 193, at 24546; Jerry Jackson, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept.-Oct.
1987, at 8; William P. Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases and the Problems, 8 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1984). This position was criticized by the EPA, the Department of
Justice, and the House Government Operations Committee. Comprehensive Wetlands Protec-
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view of the Corps' jurisdiction and upheld federal regulation of dredge
and fill discharges into nonnavigable waters, if those waters were in any
way connected to navigable waters. The courts were concerned about the
movement of pollutants from nonnavigable to navigable waters and the
maintenance of aquatic ecosystems.3 The Natural Resources Defense
Council and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) brought suit in
1975, challenging the Corps' restrictive jurisdiction. The federal district
court in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway239 invalidated the
Corps' regulations
and determined that the FWPCA authorized broader
jurisdiction.24°
The Corps responded to the NRDC decision by proposing four
alternative regulations. 24 The broadest, Alternative I, followed the EPA
regulations and asserted jurisdiction over all U.S. waters. The narrowest,
Alternative IV, asserted jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters
and was preferred by the Corps. The proposed regulations were
accompanied by an inflammatory press release claiming that under
Alternative I, ranchers who want to enlarge a stock pond and farmers
who seek to deepen an irrigation ditch or plow a field might need a
section 404 permit. 242
The EPA criticized the news release for being deliberately
misleading and accused the Corps of creating panic.243 In response, the
Corps developed interim final regulations that called for a three-phase
compliance schedule for section 404.2" There were numerous comments
on the regulations. 2n The EPA 24 and the Department of Interior 247
tion: One Step Closer to Full Implementation of § 404 of the FWPCA, 5 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,099,
10,100 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 93-1396, at 24.
238. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (D. Fla. 1974); United States v. Ashland
Oil & Transp., 364 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Ky. 1973); P.F.Z. Props. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370
(D.D.C. 1975); Leslie Salt v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also Comment,
The 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA Extend Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction Above the Mean High
Water Line, 6 RUTGERS-CAm. L.J. 823 (1975).
239. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
240. Id. See also Frasca, supra note 131, at 505. Ratliff, supra note 87, at 232-35.
241. Corps of Engineers, Dep't of Army, Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters and
Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,977, 19,766 (May 6, 1975).
242. Environmental Groups Call Corps Permits Statement Deliberately Misleading, 6 ENVT.
REP. (BNA) 145, 146 (1975). See also Comprehensive Wetlands Protection:One Step Closer to Full
Implementation of§ 404 of the FWCPA, 5 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,099, 10,101-02 (1975).
243. Comprehensive Wetlands Protection,supra note 242, at 10,101-02.
244. Corps of Engineers, Dep't of Army, Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters and
Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,795, 31,320, 31,326 (July 25, 1975). See also Caplin, supra note
139, at 449-54.
245. Development of New Regulations by the Corps of Engineers, Implementing Section 404 of
the FWPCA Concerning Permitsfor the Disposal of Dredge or Fill Material, Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Water Resources, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation,94th
Cong. (1975).
246. Id. at 2-7 (statement of Victor V. Vesey, Asst. Sec. of the Army for Civil Works).
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supported the regulations. Representative Dingell applauded broad
federal jurisdiction over waters of the United States. He asserted that if
federal jurisdiction were restricted only to navigable waters, the FWPCA
would be superfluous because the RHA already dealt with navigable
waters. 24 Representative Wright criticized the regulations for extending
49
federal jurisdiction "to every pond and puddle in [the] U.S."
The EPA issued interim final guidelines that supported the
The guidelines, which set out general
Corps' regulations.2
regarding the issuance of permits,
objectives
and
considerations
measures to protect the environment
institute
to
Corps
the
encouraged
51
navigable waters in the same
defined
EPA
The
process
in the permit
manner as the Corps.
Opponents challenged the Corps' regulations in court but were
unsuccessful.2 52 In 1976, 20 senators asked President Ford to delay the
implementation of phase II and III regulations while Congress
m
considered amendments to the FWPCA. President Ford granted the
request.254
While Congress was considering amendments to the FWPCA in
to recognize
1 9 7 7 ,n5 the Corps enacted final regulations26 that continued
and wetlakes
isolated
as
"such
the Corps' jurisdiction over waters
" 57
,
commerce.
interstate
affect
could
.which
waters..
other
lands.. .and
247.
248.

Id. at 37-39 (statement of Royston C. Hughes, Asst. Sec. of the Interior).
Id. at 85-86.

249.

Wright Seen Succeeding Jones in '77 as House Public Works Committee Head, 6 ENVT.

REP. (BNA) 1757-58 (Feb. 13, 1976).
250. Corps of Engineers, Dep't of Army, Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters and
Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 40,139, 41,292, 41,297 (Sept. 5, 1975).
251. The guidelines recommended avoiding discharges that harm the aquatic food
chain and destroy significant wetlands, preserving water quality, and protecting fish and
shellfish. The guidelines established a presumption that a permit would not be issued
unless the applicant demonstrated that the activity was water dependent or no other site or
alternative was practicable. There were also technical procedures for assessing the
chemical, physical, and biological effects of discharges. Id. See also Lawrence R. Liebesman,

The Role of EPA's Guidelines in the Clean Water Act § 404 Permit Program-JudicialInterpretation
and AdministrativeApplication, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,272, 10,273 (1984).
252.

Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114 (D. Wyo. 1977).

253.

Senators Plan to Ask President to Halt Phase II DredgeFill Rules, supra note 137, at 285.

254. Id. at 435-36.
255. In May 1977, there were two Executive Orders regarding wetlands. Executive
Order 11990, Protection of Wetlands, mandated that federal agencies minimize the
destruction of wetlands when carrying out their responsibilities. Executive Order 11988,
Flood Plain Management, required federal agencies to avoid flood plain development
when reasonable alternatives were available. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
(OTA), WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATON 74 (1984).
256. Corps of Engineers, Dep't of Army, Regulatory Programs of Corps of Engineers, 42
Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19, 1977).
257. The regulations extend federal jurisdiction to "[all other waters of the U.S. not
identified in Categories 1-3, such as isolated lakes and wetlands, intermittent streams,
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The discharge of dredge and fill material into isolated lakes and wetlands was permitted through a general permit. Only isolated lakes and
nonadjacent wetlands greater than ten acres were subject to section 404
permit requirements.m In 1977, Congress rejected efforts to limit the
Corps' jurisdiction to traditional navigable waters in the CWA.
Since the CWA did not change the jurisdictional provisions,
there was a question whether the EPA or the Corps possessed primary
authority regarding the geographical scope of federal jurisdiction.' The
Secretary of the Army requested an opinion from the Attorney General.
In 1979, the Attorney General determined that the EPA had primary
authority regarding jurisdictional issues, including section 404.m
In 1980, the EPA published revised guidelines regarding the
specifications for site disposal 261 that restated the presumption against
wetland alterations for non-water-dependent uses and "expanded it to
include 'special aquatic sites' such as important fish and wildlife
habitats, marine sanctuaries, and refuges." 262 Discharges of dredge and
fill material into aquatic ecosystems were prohibited unless the
discharger could demonstrate that there would be no adverse
environmental impacts. The "EPA [also] expressly declared that the
guidelines were 'regulatory', not advisory," so were binding on the
Corps.'
The Corps remained reluctant to assume jurisdiction over
wetlands. This inaction was reinforced by the Reagan administration,
which targeted section 404 for regulatory reform.64 The Acting Secretary
of the Army for Civil Works, Robert Dawson, was not an enthusiastic
supporter of wetlands protection.'" In 1982, the Corps promulgated
prairie potholes, and other waters that are not part of a tributary system to interstate waters
or to navigable waters of the U.S., the degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate commerce." Id. at 37,127.
258. Id. at 37,146.
259. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 709.
260. Id. (citing 43 Op. Atty. Gen. 15 (1979)). See also Civiletti Rules EPA Has Final Say on
What Constitutes "Navigable Waters", 10 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 1278-79 (Oct. 5, 1979). This
decision was later upheld in court. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897,
903 n.12 (5th Cir. 1983).
261. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). See also Liebesman, supra note 251, at 10,274.
262. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 709. See also Environmental Protection Agency,
40 CFR-Part 320, Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material,
45 Fed. Reg. 85,336-57 (1980).
263. Blumrm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 710.
264. Id. In August 1981, the President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief identified the
404 program for reform. Liebesman, supra note 251, at 10,274, citing President's Task Force
on Regulatory Relief, Administrative Reforms to the Regulatory Program Under Section 404 of
the CWA and Section 10 of the Rivers and HarborsAct (May 7, 1982).
265. Environmental groups opposed his confirmation as Assistant Secretary of the
Army in 1985. After appraising his record as deputy assistant secretary, they concluded,
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interim regulations that were designed to expedite the permit process
2
and establish a broader nationwide permit system. " The regulations
were challenged by 16 environmental groups led by the National
Wildlife Federation. 67 The Corps also signed a memorandum of
understanding with federal fishery agencies and the EPA that expedited
the permit processing and limited the opportunities for administrative
appeals.'" In 1983, the Corps proposed far reaching regulations that
would change the entire section 404 program.2 69
The Corps' 1983 proposal represented the culmination of its
regulatory reforms for several reasons.m First, William Ruckleshaus,
who became EPA Administrator in 1983, "identified section 404 as a high
priority" and opposed any changes in the guidelines. 27' Second, the

"The record of his performance over the past four and a half years demonstrates
fundamental opposition to the goals of the Clean Water Act. His positions on wetland
protection under Section 404 have been at odds with other key officials in this
Administration charged with similar responsibilities. He has succeeded only in producing
unprecedented levels of confrontation with the state and federal agencies which share a
role in the Section 404 program." Oversight Hearings on Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
Before the Senate Comm. on Env't. and Pub. Works, 99th Cong. 297, 319 (1985) (statement of
Bass Anglers Sportsman Society, Env't Defense Fund, Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, and Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n). See also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWS (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 18.
266. Corps of Engineers, Dep't of Army, 33 CFR 320-330, Interim Final Rule for
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (July 22, 1982).
267. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate six nationwide general permits and other 1982
regulatory changes. The plaintiffs were particularly concerned with nationwide permits for
activities in isolated waters. They asserted that expanding nationwide permits that were
limited to waters of less than 10 acres to include isolated waters and wetlands, regardless
of size, removed many of the nation's most important wetlands from permit requirements.
These include "700,000 to 900,000 acres of prairie potholes, 73,000 acres of wetlands in
Pocono Mountains, 350,000 acres adjacent to Great Salt Lake in Utah, 30 percent of New
England's freshwater wetlands, many thousands of acres of inland wetlands in Wisconsin,
Minnesota, New York, New Jersey, and Florida and millions of acres of Alaska's tundra
wetlands." Environmental OrganizationsSue to Undo Reagan AdministrationChanges in Section
404 Program,NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1983,
at 4-6.
268. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 711.
269. Id. (citing Corps of Engineers, Dep't of Army, 33 CFR Parts 320-323, 325, 327-28,
330, Proposal to Amend Permit Regulations for Controlling Certain Activities in Waters of
the United States, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,466, 21,469 (May 12, 1983)). The changes omitted any
reference to EPA "guidelines and reversing the presumption against wetland discharges by
stating that 'a permit will be granted unless its issuance is found to be contrary to the
public interest."' Thus, the proposal reversed the burden of proof on the applicant. Id.; also
cited in Liebesman, supra note 251, at 10,275. See also Corps Proposes Additional Revisions to §
10/§ 404 Permit Regulations,NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.),
May-June 1983,3-4.
270. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 711. See also Liebesman, supra note 251, at
10,274-75.
271. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 711. See also Liebesman, supra note 251, at 10,275.
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parties in National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh27 reached a settlement that
required the Corps to publish new regulations. 27 Third, the Corps agreed
to revise the memorandum of understanding with federal fishery
agencies and the EPA to provide greater flexibility and consultation.274
In 1985, the Court in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes
Inc., following Chevron, put to rest any doubts that section 404 was not
designed to protect wetlands. 276 The Court upheld the thrust of lower
court decisions,2 which had recognized the Corps' jurisdiction over dry
arroyos with only occasional surface flow, 2 78 an isolated lake, 27 an
isolated wetland
wetlands adjacent to a recreational lake used by
interstate travelers,8 1 private lands flooded by a federal dam, 8 2 artificial
wetlands,' a mangrove forest,tm and bottomland hardwoods.'
The Corps asserted jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands but
required a case-by-case determination for isolated waters and wetlands
regarding the substantial effects on interstate commerce.26 The problem
272. 568 F. Supp. 985 (D.D.C. 1983).
273. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 711. See also Liebesman, supra note 251, at 10,277.
The settlement agreement accomplished the following: First, the Corps acknowledged that
the EPA guidelines were mandatory. Second, the presumption against wetland discharges
was maintained. Third, section 404 would be applied to agricultural clearing, drainage, and
channeling of wetlands nationwide. Fourth, the ten-acre limit for isolated wetlands and
headlands was restated in the nationwide permit. Fifth, "a predischarge notification [was
required] for activities causing the 'loss or modification' of from one to ten acres" of wetlands. Sixth, the Corps must "seek the views of the EPA and fish and wildlife agencies
concerning proposed discharges affecting one to ten acres of special aquatic sites." Blumm
& Zaleha, supra note 98, at 711-12. See also Court Approves Settlement Agreement in NWF v.
Marsh, NAT'L WETLANDs NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 46; Corps Proposes Section 404 Regulations Implementing NWF v. Marsh Settlement, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), May-June 1984, at 2-3; Court Rules
Corps Did Not Breach NWF v. Marsh Settlement Agreement, NATL WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl.
Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 6-7.
274. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 712.
275. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
276. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 14-18.
277. Blumm & Zaleha, supranote 98, at 715-16.
278. See Quivira Mining Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985).
279. See Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
280. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher (Pond 12), 662 F. Supp. 548, 549 (S.D. Tex.
1987).
281. See United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Bailey v. United
States, 647 F. Supp. 44 (D. Idaho 1986).
282. See Swanson v. United States, 789 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1986).
283. See United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 492-94 (D.N.J. 1984).
284. See United States v. Rivera Torres, 656 F. Supp. 251 (D.P.R. 1987).
285. See U.S. v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988).
286. Jerry Jackson, Wetlands and the Commerce Clause: The Constitutionality of Current
Wetland Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 7 VA. J. NAT. RES. 307, 319, 32934 (1988). See also Jerry Jackson, The ConstitutionalTest for Wetlands Jurisdiction:Agencies in a
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with the reluctance of the Corps and the EPA to regulate isolated waters
and wetlands became apparent in the Pond 12 litigation.' After
observing a channelization operation occurring in Pond 12, a 30-acre
pothole wetland in south Texas, the FWS wanted the Corps to assert
jurisdiction. The Corps refused, alleging that its jurisdiction over isolated
waters "is limited and not clearly defined."m The FWS then pointed out
that 83 species of birds protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA) visited the pond. After the Corps again declined to assert
jurisdiction on the grounds that there was no substantial affect on
interstate commerce, "Pond 12 was subsequently destroyed."m At the
same time, other district offices of the Corps were asserting jurisdiction
over isolated waters and wetlands used by migratory birds. m
The Pond 12 case demonstrated how the Corps and the EPA
utilized the substantial effects test on a case-by-case basis to preclude
federal jurisdiction. In 1986, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF)
brought suit challenging the failure of the Corps and the EPA to assert
jurisdiction over Pond 12, alleging that the failure was part of a larger
policy regarding isolated waters. The NWF wanted the court to compel
the Corps and EPA to assert jurisdiction over all wetlands that met the
regulatory definition and declare all such wetlands to be within federal
commerce clause authority.29' In response, the Corps conceded that
waters and wetlands "which are or could be used" by migratory birds
fall within the ambit of section 4 042 "but maintained that it possessed
"3
discretion not to take enforcement action against the discharger. ,2

Muddle, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1987, at
7-9.
287. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher (Pond 12), 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987);
Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 718-19; Jackson, Wetlands and the Commerce Clause, supra
note 286, at 327-29.
288. Environmentalists Sue the Corps and EPA over Isolated Wetlands Jurisdiction, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 14.
289. The EPA concurred. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 718; Jackson, Wetlands and
the Commerce Clause, supra note 286, at 327-29.
290. Jackson, Wetlands and the Commerce Clause, supra note 286, 327-37. See also Utah v.
Marsh, 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984); Memoranda from Brigadier General Patrick J. Kelley
(Nov. 8, 1985, Feb. 11, 1986) cited in Tabb Lakes Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 72829 (E.D. Va. 1988).
291. Environmentalists Sue the Corps and EPA Over Isolated Wetlands Jurisdiction, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 13-14.
292. U.S. Army Corps Memorandum from Patrick J. Kelly, Deputy Director of Civil
Works, to Southwestern Division Commander (Feb. 11, 1986), cited in Jackson, Wetlands and
the Commerce Clause, supra note 286, at 335 n.173. See also Corps of Engineers, Dep't of
Army, CFR 320-330, Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41,206,41,217 (1986).
293. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 719; Jackson, Wetlands and the Commerce Clause,
supra note 286, at 330.
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The federal district court in National Wildlife Federation (NWF) v.
Laubscher29 held that the NWF lacked standing to secure national
injunctive relief.29 The court refused to order the restoration of wetlands
or impose fines because neither the Corps nor the EPA had undertaken
an enforcement action against dischargers. There would not be judicial
review of agency inaction.2 96 The litigation demonstrated that the Corps
possessed discretion to deny jurisdiction over nonadjacent wetlands
under section 404.2
There were numerous complaints about the Corps' ad hoc
implementation of section 404. At Senate oversight hearings in 1985 and
1986,29 the Corps' narrow interpretation of its section 404 jurisdiction
was criticized. 29 Senators Mitchellre and Chaffee 1 urged the Corps to
broaden its section 404 jurisdiction to protect wetlands. Both senators
supported federal jurisdiction over isolated waters utilized by migratory
birds and endangered species that had been announced in a 1985 EPA
302
memo.
While the Pond 12 litigation was underway, the Corps revised its
regulations.30 The preamble of the 1986 regulations contains the
migratory bird rule, which defines "the waters of the U.S." in the
following ways: waters used "as habitat by birds protected by Migratory
Bird Treaties," by migratory birds traveling interstate, "as habitat for
endangered species, or used to irrigate crops sold in interstate
commerce."3 The migratory bird rule, which was consistent with EPA
regulations, was an interpretative rule explaining particular significant
294. 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
295. Id. at 549; Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Regulation of Nonadjacent Wetlands Under
Section 404 of Clean Water Act, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 615, 636-37 (1988/1989).
296. NWF, 662 F. Supp. at 550 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)).
297. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 719. The Corps must provide a written record to
show it was a reasonable decision that is subject to judicial review. See also NWF v. Hanson,
623 F. Supp. 1539 (E.D.N.C. 1985).

298. Oversight Hearings on Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution, Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,
99th Cong. (1985).
299. Senator Stafford stated that the "intent of Congress is that wetlands are important
and are to be protected under section 404. For.. .the Army Corps of Engineers to hold
otherwise frustrates the goals of the Act." Id. at 101-03.
300. Id. at 105, 113-14.

301. Oversight Hearings on Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution, Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,
99th Cong. 1-5 (1986).
302. Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, U.S. EPA Gen. Counsel, to Richard A.
Sanderson, U.S. EPA Acting Ass't, Office of External Affairs (Sept. 12, 1985), cited in Blumm
& Zaleha, supra note 98, at 715 n.127.
303. Corps of Engineers, Dep't of Army, CFR 320-330, Final Rule for Regulatory
Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986).
304. Id. at 41,217.
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effects on interstate commerce supporting the Corps' jurisdiction. The
CWA was amended in 1987,3 but section 404 was not significantly
altered.
The migratory bird rule was challenged in Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v.
United States.3" The federal district court held that the Corps did not
properly promulgate the regulation, which was part of a November 8,
1985, memorandum from the Corps deputy director to the district
offices. The migratory bird rule was substantive, not interpretative, and
was invalid because its promulgation did not comply with notice and
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The
court raised questions about the constitutionality of the rule, stating it
had "grave doubts that a property now so used, or seen as an expectant
habitat for some migratory bird, can be declared to be such a nexus to
interstate commerce as to warrant Corps jurisdiction, we do not here
decide that issue."3 The Fourth Circuit concurred.3 The federal
government did not appeal, so the holding was only followed in the
Fourth Circuit.
Criticism of the section 404 program continued. The General
Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that the Corps' implementation of
section 404 "faile[d] to provide comprehensive wetland protection" for
several reasons: (1) "many activities that destroy wetlands" were not
covered,310 (2) "the Corps did not use the full range of the regulatory
authority it has," 31 1 (3) "the Corps frequently ignores the
recommendations of fish and wildlife agencies,"3 12 and (4) the program
lacks any systematic monitoring and enforcement." 313 One commentator
noted that "the section 404 program has no hope of achieving any
significant impact on wetlands destruction as long as its administration
is left to an agency [the Corps] that has demonstrated little enthusiasm
34
for regulating activities in the wetlands defined by its own regulation." '

305. The Water Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 76 (1987) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1267 et seq. (2000)).
306. 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988).
307. Id. at 729.
308. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
309. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WETLANDS: THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS'
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM (1988), cited in Blumm & Zaleha, supra note
98, at 761.
310. Blumn & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 761.
311. Id. at 761.
312. Id. at 761-62.
313. Id. at 762.
314. Jackson recommended that "Congress should relieve a reluctant Corps of its
regulatory duty over wetlands." Jackson, The Constitutional Test for Wetlands Jurisdiction,
supra note 286, at 9.
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The EPA and the Corps signed a memorandum in 1989
regarding section 404 jurisdiction, replacing the 1980 memo.315 The Corps
is granted jurisdictional authority but must "'fully implement' the EPA
guidance concerning the scope of section 404 jurisdiction." 31 6 The EPA is
permitted to "make jurisdiction determinations itself in any given case or
class of cases." 317 The Corps must provide the EPA with a list of its
jurisdictional decisions, so that they can be reviewed.318
The courts generally supported the migratory bird rule. 319 The
Ninth Circuit in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States320 upheld the Corps'
authority to regulate the discharge of dredge and fill material into
nonadjacent or isolated wetlands. The Corps ordered Leslie Salt to obtain
a section 404 permit prior to draining and filling wetlands formed by
previous salt making. The Corps asserted that filling in the wetlands,
which are used by migratory birds as well as the salt marsh harvest
mouse, an endangered species, would substantially affect interstate
commerce.3 21 The court did not make a factual determination
of bird
3
usage but remanded the question back to the district court. 2
The Ninth Circuit later determined that the Corps' interpretation
of the CWA was reasonable. The court concluded that "[tihere is no
suggestion in the language of the Act that isolated waters used only by
migratory birds fall within its ambit. Nevertheless, the Act's policy of
protecting wildlife could plausibly be read to stretch this far."3'
Congress intended to extend federal jurisdiction "over the waters of the
United States to the maximum extent possible under the Commerce
Clause." 324 Furthermore, the court held that "the Corps rationale for
regulating adjacent
wetlands may have some application to isolated
3
,
well.
as
waters
In 1993, the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc reversed the decision
of a three-judge panel in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, U.S.

315. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Army and EPA
Concerning the Determination of the Geographic Jurisdiction of the Section 404 Program
and the Application of the Exemptions under Section 404(f) of the CWA (Jan. 19,1989), cited
in Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 719 n.151.
316. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 98, at 719.
317. Id. at 719.
318. Id. at 720.
319. The notable exception was United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
320. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990).
321. The Ninth Circuit held that "[tlhe commerce clause power, and thus the Clean
Water Act, is broad enough to extend the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may
provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species." Id. at 360.
322. Id. at 360-61.
323. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1995).
324. Id. at 1395.
325. Id.
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Environmental Protection Agency 326 and held that the EPA could regulate
"waters whose connection to interstate commerce may be potential
rather than actual, minimal rather than substantial." 327 The court
determined that "it is reasonable to interpret the regulation as allowing
migratory birds to be that connection between a wetland and interstate
commerce. " 3' Nevertheless, the court concluded that the suitability of
the wetland as migratory bird habitat was not supported by substantial
evidence.3
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The scope of congressional commerce authority has varied
throughout U.S. history.3 The Rehnquist Court"' has resurrected
federalism to restrict federal commerce clause power. 2 The Court has
abandoned the political safeguards of federalism 33 and is ostensibly
protecting the states from encroaching federal authority.
The Court in SWANCC demanded a clear statement in the CWA
to support the Corps' jurisdiction, which posed a constitutional problem
with federalism3 4 The Court suggested that the migratory bird rule
326. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). For further comment on this case see Johnson, supra
note 188, at 27-33. Stephen Jay Stokes, The Limit of Government's Regulatory Authority over
Non-Adjacent Wetlands: Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 15 ENERGY L.J. 137, 148-49 (1994);
Douglas W. Smith & William A. Butler, Judicial Activism Threatens Wetlands, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 6-7; Virginia S.
Albrecht & David G. Isaacs, The Unreasonable Bird Rule, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl.
Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 4-5.
327. Hoffman, 999 F.2d at 261.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 261-63.
330. Initially, the Supreme Court, led by Justice Marshall, established broad expansive
federal commerce clause authority. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). From 1833 to 1937,
the Court fostered dual federalism, which restricted federal commerce power and
interfered with states' Tenth Amendment authority. United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1
(1895); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936). Following President Roosevelt's unsuccessful attempt to pack the court in 1937, the
Court retreated and accepted almost unlimited congressional commerce authority and
promoted cooperative federalism. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
331. The "federalism five" are Justices Rehnquist, O'Conner, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.
332. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). See
also Stephen R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, FederalEnvironmental Law in the "New"
FederalismEra, 30 ENVTL.L. REP. 11,122 (2000).
333. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
334. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675,683-84 (2001).
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probably exceeded federal commerce clause authority because it "would
result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary
power over land and water use."" The Court's decision was dubious.
The migratory bird rule did not pose any problems with federalism and
was well within federal constitutional authority. The migratory bird rule
should have been upheld as a legitimate exercise of federal commerce
clause power under the framework of United States v. Lopez.The Court in United States v. Lopez held that federal commerce
clause authority extends to (1) the "channels of interstate commerce"; (2)
the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce;" and (3) "activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce."- 7 The federal government can regulate intrastate
"activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce."3 Intrastate activities can also be regulated if they
are "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity" that
would "be undercut unless the intrastate activity was regulated."'
Jurisdictional boundaries must be delineated between federal and state
authority. ° There must be a distinction between "what is truly national
and what is truly local.""' Federal regulation must not impinge on an
"area of traditional state concern" to which "States lay claim by right of
history and expertise. " '
A. Things in Interstate Commerce
Lopez permits the federal government to regulate "things in
interstate commerce.",M 3 Migratory birds, which travel across state lines,
are things in interstate commerce.3" The Supreme Court supported
federal jurisdiction over migratory birds in Missouri v. Holland,3 which

335.

Id. at 684.

336.
337.

514 U.S. 549.
Id. at 558-59.

338.
339.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
Id.

340.
341.

Id. at 567.
Id. at 567-68.

342.

Id. at 580, 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

343.

Id. at 558.

344. In several earlier cases, the courts, relying on Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896), held that the commerce clause could not support federal jurisdiction over migratory
birds, which are the property of the state in which they are found. United States v. Shauver,
214 F.154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); United States v. McCullach, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).
345. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.3 The Court noted that the
protection of migratory birds has long been recognized as "a national
interest of very nearly the first magnitude."347 Since "the subject matter is
only transitorily within the state and has no permanent habitat therein,"
the birds "can be protected only by national action."3 The Court was
concerned that in the absence of the statute, there soon might not be any
birds to protect. In North Dakota v. United States, 9 the Court noted that
treaties obligate the United States to preserve and protect migratory
birds and their habitat. 3
The federal government can regulate things that cross state lines
even though they are not commercial in nature.35' In Thorton v. United
States,32 the Court declared that cattle wandering across state lines with
no economic motivation constitute interstate commerce. The Court
stated, "We do not think that such passage by ranging can be
differentiated from interstate commerce. It is intercourse between
states..." The Seventh and Ninth Circuits determined that migratory
birds, which pass between states, are objects of interstate commerce
subject to federal jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit in Cochrane v. United
States3 4 held that the federal government can act to protect national
property such as migratory birds. The court declared that "Congress
may lawfully legislate, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
(article 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3), to protect the game, nongame, and insectivorous
birds which migrate with the changing season."3 Migratory birds are no
different than cows; "their passage from state to state could not 'be
differentiated from interstate commerce.' ' 3 The Ninth Circuit in Cerritos
346. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000). See generally Betsy Vencil, Comment: The Migratory Bird Treaty
Act-Protecting Wildlife on Our National Refuges-California's Kesterson Reservoir, a Case in
Point, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 609 (1986); David G. Lombardi, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act:
Steel Shot Versus Lead Shot for Hunting Migratory Waterfowl, 22 AKRON L. REV. 343 (1989);
Murray G. Sagveen, Waterfowl Production Areas: A State Perspective, 60 N.D. L. REV. 659
(1984).

347. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
348. Id.

349. 460 U.S. 300 (1983).
350. Id. at 309-10 n.12.
351. The transportation of persons across state lines is interstate commerce. Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
584 (1997). It is not crucial that the transportation be commercial in nature. Edwards, 314
U.S. at 172 n.1; United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1275 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1228 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir.

1997).
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

271 U.S. 414 (1926).
Id. at 425.
92 F.2d 623 (1937).
Id. at 627.
Id. (citing Thornton v. U.S., 271 U.S. 414,425 (1925)).
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Gun Club v. Hall37 noted that the movement of migratory birds "across
"3
state lines made their interstate intercourse 'commerce'...
Federal regulation of migratory birds is necessary because of
their transient nature and the ineffectiveness of individual state
management?5 Migratory birds do not acknowledge political boundaries
and must be managed as integral components of the ecosystems to
which they belong.'e
The protection of migratory birds poses many of the same issues
that were involved in the reintroduction and management of the red
2
wolf."&The federal district court in Gibbs v. Babbitt3 held that prohibiting
the taking of a red wolf can be supported as the regulation of things in
interstate commerce. 3 The red wolf is a migratory creature that
originally inhabited the entire southeastern region of the United States.
By the early twentieth century, the red wolf was restricted to only 14
states. Aggressive predator control from 1920 to 1950 extinguished the
red wolf from its historic range.' The remaining red wolves were
5
captured and placed in a captive breeding program If reintroduction is
successful, the red wolves will again cross state boundaries and
repopulate the entire southeastern region.
B. Substantial Effects on Interstate Commerce
The Court in SWANCC held that filling in isolated waters,
unconnected to navigable waters except through migratory bird use,
probably did not substantially affect interstate commerce to justify
federal regulation.36 The regulation of such isolated waters intrudes on
traditional state land use authority and violates the principle of

357. 96 F.2d 620 (1938).
358. Id. at 626.
359. The commerce clause allows the federal government "to legislate concerning
transactions which, reaching across state boundaries, affect the people of more states than
one; to govern affairs which the individual states, with their limited territorial jurisdictions,
are not fully capable of governing." United States v. S.E. Underwriters Assn, 322 U.S. 533,
552 (1944).
360. George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrectionand Expansion of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 165, 166-67 (1979).
361. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Seeing Red: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2002).
362. 31 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D.N.C. 1998), affd 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
363. Id. at 535.
364. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Determination of Experimental
Population Status for an Introduced Population of Red Wolves in North Carolina, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41,790 (Nov. 19, 1986).
365. Last Chance for the American Wolf, 119 Cong. Rec. 8951-52 (Mar. 21, 1973)
(statement of Rep. William Whitehurst of Va.).
366. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675,684 (2001).
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federalism.' The Court's decision was erroneous under the Lopez
framework. The filling in of isolated waters used as habitat by migratory
birds is an economic activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce, so the cumulative impacts of this activity must be considered.
1. The Economic Nature of the Activity
Lopez requires that the regulated activity be economic in nature
or part of a larger economic regulatory program.' The regulated activity
under section 404 is the filling in of isolated waters and wetlands and the
harm to migratory bird habitat. The loss of wetlands, which are
disappearing at rate of about 300,000 acres per year, is a national
concern.' Wetlands are among the most biologically productive areas.
They are two and one-half times more productive than the most fertile
fields.3"OIsolated waters and wetlands are valuable ecosystems that
perform important national functions, such as improving water
3
quality,3' controlling flooding and erosion, " providing habitat for
374
3
migratory and endangered species, " and maintaining fish stock.
367. Id.
368. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-63 (1995).
369. Wetlands represent "five percent of the land surface of the lower 48 states. Out of
the 221 million acres of wetlands that once existed in the coterminous United States, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) estimates that there are only 103.3 million acres
remaining. Each year, development, drainage, and agriculture eliminate another 290,000
acres-an area less than half the size of Rhode Island. From the 1950s to the 1970s
conversion of wetlands to farmland caused 87 percent of all wetland losses." U.S.
Geological Survey, National Wetlands Inventory Products, USGS Fact Sheet 080-99 (Nov.
1999). See also OTA, supra note 255, at 3; Blumm, supranote 120, at 469-70.
370. Blumm, supranote 120, at 470.
371. Wetlands improve water quality by cycling nutrients, storing organic material, and
filtering out harmful pollutants. OTA, supra note 255, at 43, 48-51. For example, the "loss of
the 50% of America's remaining wetlands could cost $75 billion" in sewage treatment for
the removal of excess nitrogen. Houck & Rolland, supra note 24, at 1245. The diminishment
of water quality in one state can affect other states. For example, pollution in six states has
endangered the Chesapeake Bay. Id.
372. Wetlands detain water and curtail flow peaks downstream. OTA, supra note 255, at
43-46. Wetlands also reduce shoreline erosion and provide ground water recharge. Id. at 4648. See also Houck & Rowland, supra note 24, at 1249-50.
373. Wetlands provide food, shelter, and resting and feeding places for migratory birds.
OTA, supra note 255, at 52-54. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, 1994 UPDATE TO THE NORTH
AMERICAN WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT PLAN 20 (1994). The destruction of the habit
constitutes the destruction of the birds. Brief of the States of California et al. at 14-20,
SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178). Isolated
wetlands provide unique habitat that is essential for migratory bird survival. Id. For
example, the draining of prairie potholes in North Dakota has threatened a variety of
waterfowl in Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware. "[Iln 1980 another 5.3 million Americans
hunted migratory birds, spending $638 million. Fifty-five million Americans spent almost
$10 billion in 1980 to watch and photograph wetland-dependent birds." Houck & Rowland,
supra note 24, at 1248.
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Plants and animals exist in interconnected ecosystems, which
affect interstate commerce. 37 5 The loss of one species impacts the entire
system. 376 Disruptions in the ecosystem cause environmental instabilities
that diminish nature's ability to establish food chains, cycle nutrients,
sustain the atmospheric quality, control the climate, regulate the fresh
water supply, maintain the soil, dispose of wastes, pollinate crops, and
control pests and disease.37
Robert Costanza estimated the value of the services derived
from ecosystems to be in the range of 16 to 54 trillion dollars per year.
With an estimated annual value of $33 trillion per year, ecosystems
provide services that cost almost twice the total gross national product of
all the nations of the world combined.378 Costanza notes,
Because ecosystem services are not fully "captured" in
commercial markets or adequately quantified in terms
comparable with economic services and manufactured
capital, they are often given too little weight in policy
decisions. This neglect may ultimately compromise the
sustainability of humans in the biosphere. The economies of
the Earth would grind to a halt without the services of
ecological life-support systems, so in one sense their total
value to the economy is infinite. 379
Isolated waters and wetlands provide critical habitats that are
important for the preservation of biodiversity,m which is the "total of

374. "More than seventy percent of America's commercial seafood harvest, with an
estimated annual value of $3.6 billion and total economic output of $31 billion, originates in
coastal estuaries." Houck & Rowland, supra note 24, at 1247. See generally Environmental
Protection Agency, Protection of Nation's Wetlands, Policy Statement, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,834
(May 2, 1973).
375. Robert Costanza et al., The Value of World's Ecosystem Service and Natural Capital, 387
NATURE 253 (1987).
376. Keith Saxe, Regulated Taking of Threatened Species Under the Endangered Species Act,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 408 (1988); John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN.L. REv. 1171,
1210 (1998); George Cameron Coggins & Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening of American
Law?: The Recent Evolution of Federal Lawfor Preserving FloralDiversity, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J.
247, 252 (1987); George Cameron Coggins, Federal Wildlife Law Achieves Adolescence:
Developments in the 1970's, 1978 DUKE L.J. 753, 814 (1978); Patrick Parenteau, Rearrangingthe
Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 227, 236-44 (1998).
377. PAUL & ANNE EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 86-95 (1981).

378.
379.
380.

Costanza et al., supra note 375, at 259.
Id. at 253.
Semlitsch, supra note 192, at 5.
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genes, species and ecosystems, on the earth."3' Biodiversity is a "living,
exploitable, renewable resource" that has economic importance and
"potential consumptive and transformative uses."m2 The preservation of
genes is critical to the development of foods and medicines and the
maintenance of ecosystems.The loss of isolated waters and wetlands is due to economic
activity. Dredge and fill material is derived from agriculture, industry,
public works, and other economic activities. The filled in wetlands serve
an economic purpose,m in this case that of a landfill,' which clearly has
interstate economic and environmental impacts.3
Congress was specifically concerned with biodiversity and
7
ecosystem maintenance in the CWA.1 The Supreme Court recognized
381. Mark A. Urbanski, Chemical Prospecting,Biodiversity Conservation,and the Importance
of International Protectionof Intellectual Property Rights in Biological Materials, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L
L. 131, 134-35 (1995).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 135 n.9. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 361, at 19-23.
384. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675, 694-95 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
385. Id. at 683.
386. See also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1977); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Chemical Waste Mgmt.
Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992). See generally Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Waste War: Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Chemical Waste
Management Inc. v. Hunt, 13 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 78, 91-96 (1994).
387. The purpose of the CWA is to maintain water quality for "the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provide for recreation in and on the water."
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). The statements of two of the 1972 and 1977 Senate conferees
illustrate congressional concern with wetlands protection. Senator Baker declared that the
protection of water quality must encompass the protection of the interior
wetlands and smaller streams... .We should be mindful of the fact that
when these [wetland] areas are polluted out of existence, we will have lost
the very valuable free service of nature; and if toxic-laden dredge and fill
material is discharged into wetlands, we risk poisoning the very
foundation of our aquatic system.
123 Cong. Rec. 26,719 (1977).
Senator Muskie stated,
There is no question that the systematic destruction of the Nation's
wetlands is causing serious, permanent ecological damage. The wetlands
and bays, estuaries and deltas are the Nation's most biologically active
areas. They represent a principal source of food supply. They are the
spawning grounds for much of the fish and shellfish which populate the
ocean, and they are passages for numerous upland game fish. They also
provide nesting areas for a myriad of species of birds and wildlife.
The unregulated destruction of these areas is a matter which needs to
be corrected and which the implementation of Section 404 has attempted
to achieve.
123 Cong. Rec. 26,697 (1977).
See also 123 Cong. Rec. 38,994-96 (1977) (remarks of Reps. Ambro, Lehman, and Dingell);
123 Cong. Rec. 26,701-03, 26,713, 26,716-17 (1977) (remarks of Sens. Stafford, Hart, and
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the connection between biodiversity, ecosystem maintenance, and
interstate commerce in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes.se The
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Banks 9 held that the Corps possessed
jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands, which are hydrologically connected
to groundwater or surface water during storms. 390 The court also found
an ecological connection that is based on "the water connections and the
fact that the lots serve as habitat for birds, fish, turtles, snakes, and other

wildlife.

,391

Other courts have also recognized the nexus between ecological
harm and interstate commerce.392 The Fourth Circuit in Gibbs v. Babbitt
determined that the regulation prohibiting the taking of the red wolf
substantially affects interstate commerce by preserving biodiversity,
which includes the protection of scarce natural resources. 93 The D.C.
Circuit in National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt3 recognized the
importance of the delhi fly, an endangered intrastate species, to interstate
commerce. Judge Henderson noted that the protection of biodiversity,
which is essential for future medical and commercial activities,
substantially affects interstate commerce. 395 Furthermore, if one species is
harmed, the ecosystem will be disrupted, causing interstate impacts.396
The Fifth Circuit in Zabel v. Tabb, which upheld the Corps' refusal to
issue dredge and fill permits for ecological reasons, determined that the
destruction of fish and wildlife habitat has substantial, and in some

Chaffee); H.R. REP. No. 95-139 (1977) (additional views of Reps. Edgar and Myer). See also

Oversight Hearings on Section 404 of the Clean Water Act before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Prot.,
Senate Comm. on Envtl. & Pub. Works, 99th Cong. 244-45 (1985).
388. The Court held that "the Corps' ecological judgment about the relationship
between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal
judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act." 474 U.S. 121,
134 (1985).
389. 115 F.3d 916 (1997).
390. Id. at 921. See also U.S. v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429 (1983); Johnson, supra note 188, at 3031.
391. Banks, 115 F.3d at 921.
392. Hartsell v. United States, 127 F.3d 343 (1997) (upholding congressional authority to
regulate pollution discharge into nonnavigable waters); United States v. Olin Corp., 107
F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1999) (supporting federal regulation of onsite waste disposal as part of
Congress's scheme to protect interstate commerce from pollution and upholding
constitutionality of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA)); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting challenge
to constitutionality of the Bald Eagle Protection Act).
393. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
394. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See generally, John C. Nagle, The Commerce Clause
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998); Fiona M. Powell,
PropertyRights, Federalism,and the Endangered Species Act, 29 REAL EsTATE L.J. 13 (2000).
395. Gibb, 130 F.3d. at 1052-54.
396. Id. at 1057-60.

Winter 20031

ISOLATED WATERS AND MIGRATORY BIRDS

59

areas, devastating effects on interstate commerce.' Dredge and fill
permits "may tend to destroy ecological balance and thereby affect
398
commercial sustainability.'
Only the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Wilson,3" determined
that the Corps did not have jurisdiction over isolated waters and
wetlands. The Fourth Circuit held that the Corps' regulation asserting
jurisdiction over waters that are intrastate or nonnavigable because their
use, degradation, or destruction could affect interstate commerce was
beyond the scope of the commerce clause. The regulation failed to
require any substantial effect on interstate commerce or a sufficient
nexus with navigable or interstate waters. The majority stated that
"waters of the United States" must refer "to waters that, if not navigable
in fact, are at least interstate or closely related to navigable or interstate
waters." Two of the three judges on the panel, however, registered
reservations. Judge Luttig concurred but disagreed with the majority's
commerce clause analysis. 4°1 Judge Payne, dissenting in part, held that a
hydrological connection to surface or ground water or a nexus to an
aquatic ecosystem is all that is necessary to establish the Corps'
jurisdiction.4m
The district court in SWANCC refused to follow Wilson' and
determined that federal jurisdiction pursuant to the CWA was
The Seventh Circuit in
coextensive with the commerce clause.'
*5
there was no concern
that
found
and
'
Wilson
rejected
SWANCC also
"facts show that
because
commerce
interstate
on
effects
with potential
on migratory
effect
immediate
an
have
would
acres
17.6
the
the filling of
habitat."4
as
area
the
use
birds that actually
The harm to migratory bird habitat also substantially affects
interstate commerce. People travel to hunt, observe, and photograph
migratory birds. In 1991, the FWS determined that 76 million Americans
watched and photographed federal birds and wildlife and spent over

397. 430 F.2d 199, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1970).
398. Id.
399. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997); see also generally Christopher N. Challis, Standing Alone
in Murky Waters: Evaluating the Fourth Circuit's Solitary Stance on Federal Wetlands Regulation,
34 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 1179 (1999); J. Sloane Strickler, Federal Wetlands Jurisdiction, 5
ENVrL. L. 225 (1998).
400. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257.
401. Id. at 266.
402. Id. at 266-69.
1998).
403. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 998 F. Supp. 946,951 (N.D. Ill.
404. Id. at 951-52.
405. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1999).
406. Id. at 852.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

$18.1 billion.so This generated $3 billion in tax revenues and created
766,600 jobs.4 In 1997, the FWS found that 3.1 million Americans spent
$1.3 billion to hunt migratory birds in 1996. Migratory bird hunters spent
$720 million on equipment and eleven percent of these hunters crossed
state lines.& Another 62.9 million Americans spent $29 billion observing
wildlife, including birds. 410 Almost $20 billion was spent on equipment
for wildlife watching. Of the 17.7 million bird watchers, 14.3 million
people took trips to observe waterfowl; 9.5 million took trips for
shorebirds, such as herons. More than six million people crossed state
lines to participate in bird watching.4 ' In 1996, hunters of migratory
birds in Illinois spent $293 million and 1.2 million people in Illinois spent
on average $231 each observing, feeding, and photographing
waterfowl.412
Migratory bird populations are decreasing because of the loss
and destruction of their habitat. 413 The cumulative impact of the loss of
wetlands is devastating. As the habitat decreases, greater numbers of
birds are forced to share less space and "wetland ghettos" are created
where disease spreads rapidly. As populations decline, the opportunities
for hunting, observing, and photographing decrease, as do the revenues
generated by these activities. 41 4 It is clear that the loss of habitat substantially affects interstate commerce.
Several lower court decisions held that the economic impact of
tourism, recreation, and hunting establishes a sufficient nexus with
interstate commerce to justify the migratory bird rule. The Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Byrd416 held that the Corps can regulate the
deposit of dredge and fill material into wetlands adjacent to an intrastate
407. James D. Caudill, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 1991 Economic Impacts of NonConsumptive Wildlife Related Recreation (1997), cited in Nagle, supranote 376, at 1209.
408. Id.
409. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, United States Dep't of Interior, & Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1996 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and WildlifeAssociated Recreation 25, 60 (1997), cited in Brief for the Federal Respondents at 48-49,
SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
410. Id. at 91, cited in Brief for the Federal Respondents at 48-49, SWANCC v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
411. Id. at 45, 90, cited in Brief for the Federal Respondents at 48-49, SWANCC v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178). See also SWANCC v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999).
412. SOUTHWICK ASSOCIATES, THE EcONOMIc BENEFITS OF WATCHABLE WILDLIFE
RECREATION DURING 1996 IN ILLINOIS at 4, 8 (1998), cited in Brief of the States of California
et al. at 22, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
413. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, WATERFOWL FOR THE FUTURE; NORTH-AMERICAN
WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT PLAN 8-9 (1989).

414.
415.
416.

Id.
Johnson, supra note 188, at 39.
609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
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lake utilized by interstate tourists. If the water quality is destroyed,
418
tourism will end.417 The Tenth Circuit in Utah v. Marsh determined that
the Corps can exercise jurisdiction over an intrastate lake used by
interstate travelers. Interstate tourists come to the lake to see,
photograph, and appreciate birds and animals. Migratory birds use the
lake as habitat. Interstate tourists and migratory birds provide a
419
sufficient connection with interstate commerce.
The Ninth Circuit in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States held that "[t]he
commerce clause power.. .is broad enough to extend the Corps'
jurisdiction to local waters that may provide habitat to migratory birds
and endangered species." 20 In Hoffman Homes Inc. v. U.S. EPA, the
Seventh Circuit observed that tourist travel and spend money hunting,
trapping, and observing migratory birds.42 The loss of wetlands will
result in a loss of opportunities, which provide a sufficient connection
with interstate commerce.422
Other cases have held that tourism and scientific study establish
a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce. In Gibbs v. Babbitt, the
Fourth Circuit recognized a direct connection between the taking of a red
wolf and interstate commerce.4 Judge Luttig held that absent red wolves
there will be no related interstate tourism or scientific study. There is no
4
need to pile inference upon inference to support this conclusion. A
federal district court in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources4 determined that the demise of the palila, an endangered
species found only on Hawaii, would substantially affect interstate
commerce by precluding the "interstate movement of persons, such as
amateur students of nature or professional scientists who come to a state
417. Id. at 1210.
418. 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
419. Id. at 803-04.
420. 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990); See also Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d
1388, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1995); John A. Leman, The Birds: Regulationof Isolated Wetlands and the
Limits of the Commerce Clause, 28 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REv. 1237 (1995). Renee Stone, Wetlands
Protection and Development: The Advantages of Retaining Federal Control, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
137 (1991).
421. 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993); Stokes, supranote 326; Dennis J. Priolo, Section 404
of the Clean Water Act: The Case for Expansion of FederalJurisdiction over Isolated Wetlands, 30
LAND & WATER L. REV. 91, 96-101 (1995); Robert D. Icsman, Comment: Hoffman Homes, Inc. v.
Administrator, U.S. EPA: The Seventh Circuit Gets Bogged Down in Wetlands, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
809 (1993).
422. Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261; see also United States v. Hallmark Const. Co., 14 F.
Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Rueth v. U.S. EPA, 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993); Village of
Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994); SWANCC v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 998 F. Supp. 946, 951-52 (N.D. Il. 1998).
423. 214 F.3d 483,492-97 (4th Cir. 2000).
424. Id.
425. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
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to observe and study these species, which would otherwise be lost by
6
state inaction. " 42
2. PrecludingInterstateMarket Advantage
The protection of isolated waters, wetlands, and migratory birds
also substantially affects interstate commerce by preventing any state
from establishing a competitive interstate market advantage.da Ifa state
fails to protect isolated waters and wetlands, the economic interests in
the state will have the advantage of lower production costs. If a state
wants to attract and promote business, it will not preserve isolated
waters and wetlands, precipitating a race to the bottom. Congress can act
to prevent a state from attaining any interstate competitive market
advantage.
Furthermore, the destruction of isolated waters and
wetlands will have interstate consequences.'
Federal standards are necessary to preclude states being placed
at a competitive disadvantage for having stronger environmental
protection standards. The Supreme Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Association43 recognized that Congress can
regulate intrastate activity that endangers interstate commerce. The
Court upheld the Surface Mining and Reclamation Control Act
(SMRCA), noting that "[the] inadequacies in existing state laws and the
need for uniform minimum nationwide standards made federal
regulations imperative."*' National standards were necessary "to insure
that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced
in different States will not be used to undermine the ability of several
states to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining
operations within their borders.42
426.

Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 995.

427. Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite U.S. v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 609-10 (1995). See also Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationalefor Federal

Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992).
428. The federal policy of wetlands preservation could be frustrated by inadequate state
protection of isolated waters and wetlands. North American Wetlands Conservation
Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4414 (2000); Water Bank Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1311 (2000). See also
Exec.
Order No. 11,990,42 Fed. Reg. 26,961 (May 24, 1997).
429. Federal wetlands regulation protects against the effects of one state filling in waters
and wetlands on other states water quality, flood control, and wildlife management.
Citizens in one state have additional concerns about activities in another state because
their
federal taxes pay the bill when federal assistance is required for increased public health
care costs, flood protection, emergency relief, and environmental cleanups when wetlands
are not able to perform their functions. Brief of the States of California et al., at 21-22,
SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
430. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
431. Id. at 280.
432. Id. at 281-82.
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Other courts have employed this rationale. The D.C. Circuit in
National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt held that the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) regulates economic activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce.' The court determined that the ESA, like the
SMRCA, regulates private intrastate commercial activities to prevent
the
4
actions that will harm interstate commerce by destroying
other states. 3
in
species
of
variety
the
and
environmental quality
Furthermore, the ESA, like the SMRCA, ensures that economic growth
does not undermine conservation and species preservation, which are
essential to interstate commerce.m
The Fourth Circuit in Gibbs v. Babbitt determined that the antitaking regulation prevents a state from establishing any unfair
No state can lower its wildlife
competitive market advantage.4
protection standards to benefit in-state economic interests. Federal
437
regulation avoids the race to the bottom.
C. Jurisdictional Limits
Lopez requires that the federal statute contain jurisdictional limits
to distinguish between federal and state authority.4 One of the
jurisdictional constraints regarding the discharge of dredge and fill
material into isolated waters and wetlands was migratory bird habitat.
Habitat is the area where the members of a species grow and live, not
just visit.4 3 9 The migratory bird rule required a case-by-case
determination by the Corps regarding the suitability of the isolated
waters as migratory bird habitat prior to issuing any permit, as was done
in the SWANCC case."O
The jurisdictional parameters of the migratory bird rule were
acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit in Hoffman Homes v. EPA.4" The
court held that the adverse impact on tourism resulting from the loss of
migratory bird habitat constituted a sufficient connection to interstate
However, the court
commerce to justify federal jurisdiction.

433. 130 F.3d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
434. Id. at 1055-56.
435. Id. at 1054-57.
436. 214 F.3d 483, 501-503 (4th Cir. 2000).
437. Id.
438. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995).
439. McAllister & Glicksman, supra note 332, at 11,128.
440. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 848-49 (7th Cir. 1999). See
also Edward A. Morrissey, The Jurisdictionof the Clean Water Act over Isolated Wetlands: The
Migratory Bird Rule, 22 J. LEGIS. 137, 142-43 (1996).
441. 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993).
442. Id.
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determined that there was not substantial evidence that the site served as
migratory bird habitat."3
The Fourth Circuit made a similar finding regarding
jurisdictional limitations in Gibbs v. Babbitt.' The court determined that
the anti-taking regulation did not apply to all wildlife and plants but was
restricted to endangered and threatened species.' 5
D. Traditional State Authority
Lopez is concerned that federal regulation does not intrude upon
traditional state authority.' The regulation of migratory birds is not a
traditional state function. The control over the discharge of dredge and
fill material into isolated waters and wetlands is an environmental
regulation that is designed to control the impacts of pollution, not a land
use regulation regarding the use of the site. 7
Migratory birds are not subject to state authority. Initially,
migratory birds were considered to be wildlife under state jurisdiction,
not subject to federal commerce clause authority."" The United States
and Great Britain signed a treaty in 1916 to protect migratory birds in the
United States and Canada, which was implemented by the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) in 1918.49 The Court upheld the MBTA in
Missouri v. Holland "5 as being necessary and proper to implement the
treaty. Federal treaty making authority was not limited by any "invisible
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."" Justice
Holmes noted that the federal interest in protecting migratory birds is of
"very nearly the first magnitude ....
[Because of their transitory nature,

443.
444.
445.
446.

Id. at 261-63.
214 F.3d 483, 504-05 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995); see also id. at 568-583 (Kennedy,

J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).

447. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675, 693 (2001) (Stevens,
J.,
dissenting).
448. United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 292 (D. Kan. 1915); United
States v.
Shauver, 214 F.154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
449. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (2000). See also George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian
T. Patti,

The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 165

(1979).
450. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
451. Id. at 434. Missouri's invocation of Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 619 (1896),
which
upheld state control over wildlife, was also rejected. The Court stated that "the
State may
regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its
authority is
exclusive of paramount powers. To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean
upon a
slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession
is the
beginning of ownership." Missouri, 252 U.S. at 434-35.
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2
they] can be protected only by national action.", The Court has
subsequently declared that the MBTA can also be justified under federal
commerce clause authority.'
The federal government is committed to the preservation and
management of migratory birds and has established an extensive system
of wildlife refuges, waterfowl management areas, and migratory bird
sanctuaries that serve as migratory bird habitat.4 The Migratory Bird
Conservation Act was enacted in 1929, authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to acquire land "for.. .use... as inviolate sanctuaries for migratory
birds."45 In 1934, the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act was passed to
provide funding for land acquisitions under the Migratory Bird
Conservation Act.45 Congress amended the Stamp Act in 1958,
increasing the price of duck stamps, to hasten the acquisition of land for
7
When this proved insufficient, Congress
migratory bird habitat.
provided additional revenues through the Wetlands Act of 1961.' The
funds for°
Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 19654 authorizesBank
Act4
The Water
the purchase of natural areas, including wetlands.
was enacted in 1970 "to conserve water, preserve and improve the
condition of migratory waterfowl habitat and other wildlife
through long-term land use agreement with landowners and
resources, ...
operators in important migratory waterfowl nesting and breeding
areas."4' In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency Wetlands Resource
Act, which increased the price of duck stamps to accelerate the speed of
wetland preservation.'
The North American Waterfowl Management Plan, signed in
1986, recognizes that restoring wetlands and associated ecosystems is
necessary for the recovery and perpetuation of waterfowl populations.'
The Plan committed the United States and Canada to cooperative efforts

452. Id. at 435.
453. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 58 (1979). See also United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d
1475, 1482 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining that eagle extinction would have a substantial
impact on interstate commerce).
454. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, THE NORTH AMERICAN WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT
PLAN 12 (1989); North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 302-04 (1983). See generally
OTA, WETLANDS, supra note 255, at 9, 69-80.
455. 16 U.S.C. § 715(e) (2000).
456. 16 U.S.C. § 718 (2000).
457. 16 U.S.C. § 718d(c) (2000).
458. 16 U.S.C. § 715k (2000).
459. 16 U.S.C. § 4601 (2000). See also OTA, WETLANDS, supra note 255, at 72-73.
460. 16 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000).
461. S. REP. No. 96-449 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2778, 2778-79. The Water
Bank Act was amended in 1979 to adjust payment rates, expand the types of wetlands
eligible for the program, and increase annual appropriations. Id.
462. Pub. L. No. 99-645, 100 Stat. 3582 (1986).
463. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, supranote 454, at 13.
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to stop the decline in waterfowl populations and their habitats. Mexico
joined in 1988 and became a full partner in 1994. Since 1986, the
participants "have invested over $500 million for waterfowl and wetland
conservation and over 2 million acres of habitat have been purchased,
leased, restored, secured, or enhanced for wildlife."'
Congress amended the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act in
1988 to "require the Secretary of Interior to identify conservation
measures to assure that nongame migratory bird species do not reach the
point at which measures of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 are
necessary."' In 1989, the North American Wetlands Conservation Act6
was enacted "to protect, enhance, restore, and manage an appropriate
distribution and diversity of wetland ecosystems and other habitats for
migratory birds and other fish and wildlife in North America."4 7
Wildlife protection is not an exclusive state function. 46 There are
numerous federal statutes that protect wildlife, including the Lacey
Act,6 9 Bald Eagle Protection Act,47 ° Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 4n
Endangered Species Act, 4n and Wild Free-Range Horses and Burros

464. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, 1994 UPDATE TO THE NORTH AMERICAN WATERFOWL
MANAGEMENT PLAN 2 (1994). See also Stephen Brown, Building Partnershipsfor Wetlands:
U.S. Shorebird Conservation Plan, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington,
D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 3-4.
465. 16 U.S.C. § 4401(a)(10) (2000).
466. 16 U.S.C. § 4401 et seq.
467. 16 U.S.C. § 4401(b)(1).
468. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 361, at 39-51. See also William S. Boyd, Federal
Protectionof Endangered Wildlife Species, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1289 (1970); Davina K. Kaile, Note:
Evolution of Wildlfe Legislation in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Legal Efforts to ProtectEndangered
Species and Its Prospects for the Future, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1993); George
Cameron Coggins & William H. Hensley, ConstitutionalLimits on FederalPower to Protectand
Manage Wildlife: Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered? 61 IOWA L. REV. 1099 (1976);
Byron Swift, Endangered Species Act: ConstitutionalTensions and Regulatory Discord, 4 Colum.
J. Envtl. L. 97, 105-13 (1977); George Cameron Coggins, Wildlife and the Constitution: The
Walls Come Tumbling Down, 55 WASH. L. REV.295 (1980).
469. 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2000); Fitzgerald, supra note 361, at 42-43. See also Robert S.
Anderson, The Lacey Act: America's Premier Weapon in the Fight Against Unlawful Wildlfe
Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27 (1995); Michael E. Field, The Evolution of the Wildl!fe
Taking Concept from Its Beginning to Its Culminationin the Endangered Species Act, 21 Hous.L.
REV. 457,468-69 (1984).
470. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2000).
471. 16 U.S.C. § 661 (2000).
472. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2000).
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474
Act. 4m These statutes have been upheld under the Commerce Clause,
476
4m
the Property Clause, and the Treaty Clause.
Congress did not attempt to end state authority in the CWA,
4
which reflects cooperative federalism. 7 The FWPCA initially focused on
m
4
state implemented water quality standards. After this method proved
ineffective, the 1972 FWPCA amendments moved to federal point source
control, 4m including the discharge of dredge and fill material. Congress
amended section 404 in 1977. Many normal farming, silviculture, and
ranching activities are exempted from section 404 requirements.40 The
federal government retains exclusive jurisdiction over the discharge of
dredge and fill material into traditional navigable waters, but the states
are encouraged to assume control over dredge and fill operations in nontraditional navigable waters."
The regulation of dredge and fill discharges into isolated waters
and wetlands is an environmental regulation under federal authority,
not a land use control under state jurisdiction. The distinction between
environmental regulation and land use control is subtle. An environmental regulation focuses on pollution control. Pollution is usually the
result of cumulative decentralized decisions by numerous individuals
who do not coordinate their activities; therefore, national standards are
required. Land use controls regulate the location of human activity arid
the commitment of a site to a particular purpose. Land use decisions
affect a small number of individuals who are related to2 the site and such
decisions are generally under state and local control.4 According to the
Court, "Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the
land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular
uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is used, damage
limits."4
to the environment is kept within prescribed

473. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
474. United States v. Bryant, 716 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Power, 923
F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding the Lacey Act); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979);
United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Bald Eagle Protection
Act).
475. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (upholding the Wild Free Roaming
Horses and Burros Act).
476. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 361, at
39-52.
477. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000).
478. For a history of federal water pollution control, see S. REP. No. 92-414 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3669,3677.
479. Id. at 3675-77.
480. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (2000).
481. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g).
482. RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:
READINGS, MATERIALS,AND NOTES 23-28 (2d. ed. 1978).
483. Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,587 (1987).
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Section 404 is not a planning provision that dictates the
particular use of the property but affects development of the property by
eliminating or mitigating any adverse environmental impacts.4 Section
404 is similar to other federal requirements that impact land use.' Under
the purview of the Commerce Clause, the Court has upheld federal land
use restrictions designed to prevent environmental harm.4
V. POLITICAL REACTION
The Court's decision in SWANCC places national wetlands,
which are rapidly disappearing,4 7 at risk.i If federal jurisdiction
pursuant to the CWA is limited to wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters, only 20 percent of the national wetlands will be protected. The
remaining 80 percent of the nation's wetlands, which include prairie
potholes, wet meadows, forest wetlands along non-navigable rivers and
484. The Corps rarely denies a section 404 permit. Between 1995 and 1999, the Corps
only denied 0.3 percent of the annual 74,500 permit requests. Zinn & Copeland, Wetland
Issues, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief (May 1, 2000), cited in Brief of the States
of California et al., at 29-30, SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001)
(No. 99-1178).
485. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2000), particularly 42 U.S.C. § 7410
(federal requirements for state implementation programs); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (2000), particularly 42 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1313(e) (area-wide waste
treatment plants); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (2000). See also
Ablard & O'Neill, supra note 89, at 109 n.222.
486. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995). See also Peter A. Buchsbaum, Federal Regulation of Land Use: Uncle Sam the Permit
Man, 25 URB. LAW. 589 (1993); Peter A. Buchsbaum & Thomas C. Shearer, Report of the
Subcommittee on Federal Regulation of Land Use, 26 URB. LAW. 831 (1994); Peter A.
Buchsbaum, James E. Brookshire, Roger Platt, The Federal Government and Land Use: The Not
So Quiet Evolution Continues, 28 URB. LAW. 517 (1996); Peter A. Buchsbaum, SWANCC:
A
Retreatfrom FederalRegulation of Land Use? 33 URB. LAW. 753 (2001).
487. From the 1780s through the 1980s, the contiguous United States lost 54 percent of
the estimated 221 million acres of wetlands. Between the 1950s and 1970s, the lower 48
states lost an estimated 458,000 acres of wetlands annually; and from the 1970s through the
1980s, the yearly loss was 290,000 acres. From 1985 through 1995, the United States
experienced an annual loss of 117,000 acres of wetlands. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE,
STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE COTERMINCOUS U.S. 9 (2000). See Teresa Opheim,
Wetland Losses Continue but Have Slowed, NATL WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 1.
488. For a discussion on the scope of SWANCC, see Robert G. Dreher, Unsettling the
Balance of Federalism: The SWANCC Decision, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr.2001, at 1; David M. Ivester, The Supreme Court Draws the Line,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 5; Derb
S. Carter, Jr., Supreme Court Decision Defies Common Sense and Intent of Congress, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 7; Jon Kusler,
supra note 6, at 9. See also National Wildlife Federation, NRDC, WETLANDS AT RISK:
IMPERILED TREASURES availableat http://www.nwf.org/wetlands/wetlandsatrisk.html (last
visited Mar. 17, 2003).
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lakes, forested wetlands, playas, vernal pools, flats, bogs, and Alaskan
tundra, will be exposed. If federal jurisdiction includes navigable waters,
their tributaries, and adjacent wetlands, 40 to 60 percent of the nation's
wetlands will be sheltered. If waters with a significant nexus to
navigable waters are regulated, 80 percent of the wetlands will be
secured.' 9 The Court's49°decision also threatens migratory birds by
decreasing their habitat.
The Court's decision generated political responses. On January
10, 2001, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13186, outlining the
responsibilities of federal agencies regarding the protection of migratory
birds. 491 The order declared that "migratory birds are of great ecological
492
and economic value" to the United States. International agreements
place affirmative duties on the United States. Any federal agency undertaking action that can harm migratory birds is instructed to develop and
that will
implement a memorandum of understanding with the FWS
"promote the conservation of migratory bird populations." 49 An interagency Council for the Conservation of Migratory Birds is established to
94
oversee the implementation of the order. The Executive Order has not
495
been revoked by President Bush.
The EPA and the Corps adopted a narrow reading of the Court's
decision, which only precludes the assertion of jurisdiction over waters
4
used by migratory birds. 9 The EPA and Corps believe that the Court's
holding in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. establishes the
basis for federal jurisdiction. In addition, federal jurisdiction over other
waters can occur if there is a "significant nexus" between these waters
and waters of the United States or "their use, degradation, or destruction

489. Jon Kusler, The SWANCC Decision and State Regulation of Wetlands 1, 7-8, prepared
for the Association of State Wetlands Managers (2001), availableat http://www.aswm.org/
fwp/swancc/aswm-int.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2003); Kusler, supra note 6, at 9-12.
490. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 454, at 8-9.
491. Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to Protect Migratory Birds, Exec. Order No.
13,186, 66 Fed. Reg. 3853 (Jan. 17, 2001). This builds on other orders that protect wetlands
and floodplains.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Johnson, supra note 188, at 10,677. One commentator noted that "the Bush
Administration's attitude toward environmental regulation might best be characterized as
'quietly hostile."' Thomas 0. McGarity, Jogging Place: The Bush Administration's Freshman
Year Environmental Record, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,709, 10,720 (2002).
496. Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, EPA, and Robert M.
Anderson, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regarding Supreme Court Ruling
Concerning Clean Water Act Jurisdiction over Isolated Waters (Jan. 2001) (on file with
author).
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could affect other waters of the U.S." 497 The EPA and the Corps are working on a new definition of wetlands.498
The courts have limited the SWANCC holding to a rejection of
the migratory bird rule and continued to give a broad reading to the
term "waters of the U.S."4 For example, the courts have found an
irrigation ditch connected to an intermittent tributary of a navigable
water,' a spring connected to a non-navigable stream,51 and ground
water connected to surface water to be "waters of the U.S. " 0
Congress can act to include isolated waters within the definition
of navigable, 0 3 to establish national wetlands legislation," or to protect
migratory bird habitat pursuant to the treaty or property clauses.-e There
497. Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After SWANCC, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,669, 10,674-77 (2001).
498. Clean Water Act-Definition of Waters of the United States, 66 Fed. Reg. 26,258
(May 14, 2001); Clean Water Act-Definition of Waters of the United States, 67 Fed. Reg.
33,864 (May 13, 2002); Excerpt from "Supreme Court Ruling Concerning Clean Water Act
Jurisdiction over Isolated Waters," NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington,
D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 4. See generally Agency Implementation of the SWANCC Decision,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs,
House Comm. on Gov. Reform (Sept. 19, 2002), available at http://www.reform.house.gov/
reg/hearings/index.htm#September92002 (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
499. See generally Patrick Parenteau, Position Paper on the Clean Water Act Jurisdiction
Determinations Pursuant to the Supreme Court's January 9, 2001 Decision, SWANCC v. Corps,
presented to Administrator Whitman, U.S. EPA, the Association of State Wetlands
Managers, Inc. (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.aswm.org/propub/pubs/aswmpublist.htm (last visited March 17, 2003); Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New
Federalism and Clean Water Jurisdiction (forthcoming in ENVTL. L.). See also Douglas
T.
Kendall, et al., ConservativeJudicialActivism and the Environment: An Assessment of the Threat,
32 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,835, 10,838 n.37 (2002).
500. Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526,533 (9th Cir. 2001).
501. Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1179 (D. Idaho 2001).
502. United States v. Interstate General Co., 152 F. Supp.2d 843, 847 (D. Md. 2001). See
also United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001); United States v. Krillich,
152 F. Supp. 2d 983 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81, 119
(E.D.N.Y 2001); California Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp.
2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Colvin v. U.S., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Borden Ranch
Partner v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001). However, there have
been several decisions that have limited federal jurisdiction pursuant to SWANCC. See Rice
v. Harken Energy Expl. Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d
1011(E.D. Mich. 2002); U.S. v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 788 (E.D.
Mich. 2002); U.S. v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Va. 2002).
503. The Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2002 was introduced by Senator
Feingold "to provide protection to waters of the United States to the fullest extent of the
legislative authority of Congress under the Constitution..." S. 2780, 107th Cong. (2002).
A
companion bill was introduced in the House by Representative Oberstar that had
15
Democratic co-sponsors. H.R. 5194, 107th Cong. (2002).
504. Kusler, supranote 6, at 12. See also OTA, WETLANDs, supra note 255, at 14-21.
505. Fitzgerald, supra note 361, at 45-47; Johnson, supra note 497, at 10,679; Michael
J.
Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Protection in a Post-Lopez World: Some Questionsand Answers,
30 ENVm. L. REP. 10,980, 10,988-90 (2000).
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is, however, little chance of a congressional reaction because the Republicans regained control of Congress in 2002.0
State and local regulation can partially fill in the gaps created by
the Court in SWANCC.0 Fifteen states provide protection for isolated
waters and wetlands, including Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. The
remaining 35 states rely upon the federal program to protect their
wetlands.- Section 401 of the CWA requires applicants for section 404
permits to receive state water quality certification, which grants the
states a veto over the permit and the ability to attach conditions for
permit approval to protect state wetlands.-" Ironically, by decreasing
federal authority, the Court also reduces state authority pursuant to
over
section 401 and discourages states from assuming jurisdiction
5 10
section 404 permitting in nontraditional navigable waters.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in SWANCC represents conservative
activism. 1 It is institutional activism because the Court elevated its
views over the decisions of the democratically accountable legislative
12
and executive branches. The Court did not follow the text, intent, and
purposes of the CWA, which indicated broad federal jurisdiction over
"the waters of the U.S." The Court ignored strong executive precedent
and overruled a long-standing Corps and EPA interpretation of the
CWA. The Court reinforced its interpretation of the CWA by questioning
the constitutionality of broad federal jurisdiction. It is also policy

506. From 1993 though 2002, the Republicans' pro-environmental score ranged from
nine percent to 19 percent in the Senate and from 16 percent to 32 percent in the House. The
Democrats achieved higher pro-environmental scores, ranging from 75 percent to 84
percent in the Senate and from 68 percent to 81 percent in the House. See LEAGUE OF
available at
CONSERVATION VOTERS' NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCORECARDS, 1993-2002,
http://www.lcv.org/scorecard/scorecardList.cfm?c=25 (last visited May 8, 2003).
507. Kusler, supra note 6, at 9-12; Johnson, supra note 497, at 10,679-80; Frasca, supra note
131, at 519-20.
508. Kusler, supranote 6, at 10.
509. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
510. SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675, 693 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Kusler, supranote 6, at 11.
511. See generally Kendall et al., supranote 499.
512. Institutional activism occurs when the judicial decision "tends to expand judicial
power either absolutely or relative to other institutions of government, and, conversely,
reflects institutional restraint when it tends to limit judicial power." Robert E. Levy &
Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's EnvironmentalLaw
Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 348 (1989).
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activism because the Court continued to advance its pro-development
agenda and discount the protection of the environment. 3
The Court did not follow the two-step Chevron framework in
SWANCC. Step one requires the Court to determine if Congress
addressed the interpretative issue. When examining congressional
action, the traditional tools of statutory interpretation-text, intent,
purposes-are employed. The Court in SWANCC relied principally on
the text of the CWA, but its interpretation of the text was questionable.
The Court made a cursory review of the legislative history and
mistakenly concluded that Congress intended to limit the Corps'
jurisdiction to traditional navigable waters. The Court completely
ignored the legislative purposes and rendered a decision that frustrates
the ecological goals of the CWA and undermines federal policy to
preserve wetlands and protect migratory birds.
Step two in Chevron requires the court to defer to the agency's
interpretation of the statute, if it is reasonable. The Court in SWANCC
did not adopt the Corps' interpretation because there was no clear
statement of congressional intent in the CWA to justify such broad
federal jurisdiction into a traditional area of state authority. Mandating
a strong clear statement allowed the Court to ignore clear signals in the
legislative history and statutory purposes." The Court advanced its own
views without directly provoking a hostile reaction from Congress." 6 The
Court engaged in the classic "bait-and-switch."51 7 Congress enacted the
CWA with presumptions about how it would be interpreted and its
constitutionality. The Court changed the interpretive framework and
undermined the prior legislative assumptions.
The Court refused to defer to the Corps' interpretation because it
threatened federalism" and raised constitutional doubt.5 9 The Court's
513. Policy activism occurs when the "court uses the judicial power to pursue
its own
choice of policy." Id. at 350, 421-24. Glicksman and Levy concluded, after studying
the
Court's decisions from 1976 through 1988, that "the Supreme Court has been
making
environmental policy-a pro-development policy contrary to the pro-environment
policy
chosen by Congress." Id. at 347. See generally MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE
DEMISE OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERIcAN LAW (1996).
514. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 223, at 82, noted, "Like the Court's erratic
textualist
performance in statutory cases, its application of quasi-constitutional clear statement
rules
has been tactically clever in the short-term but institutionally risky in the longer-term.
The
Court's adventurism has been most apparent, and most normatively questionable,
in the
super-strong clear statement rules protecting states' rights at the expense of
individual
rights and national policies."
515. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 217, at 595-98, 629-46. Healy, supra note 7, at
10,940.
516. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 223, at 85.
517. Id.; Healy, supra note 7, at 10,939 n.108.
518. See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 217, at 619-29.
519. The constitutional doubt canon requires that when "an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
court will
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invocation of these canons of statutory interpretation was questionable.s
The migratory bird rule did not present a problem with federalism, nor
was it beyond the scope of congressional commerce power. The
avoidance of constitutional doubt canon poses separation of powers
problems and encourages judicial activism. The Court's canonical
jurisprudence in SWANCC undermined Chevron, which instructs the
courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretation. Deference to the
Corps' reasonable statutory interpretation would have precluded any
52
constitutional doubt. 1
The Court in SWANCC also ignored strong executive precedent
regarding the Corps' jurisdiction and invalidated a regulation that had
been in place in a general manner since 1975 and in a specific manner for
15 years. There was no demand for a change in the policy by Congress or
the Executive Branch. The Court simply substituted its pro-development
position for the environmental protection in the regulations.52
The Court in SWANCC also suggested that even if Congress had
authorized the migratory bird rule, the rule probably would still be
unconstitutional. The Court's conclusion was dubious under the Lopez
framework. Lopez allows the regulation of activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce individually or in aggregate. The destruction
of isolated waters and wetlands is an economic activity that harms the
ecosystem and biodiversity, which are important for interstate
commerce. The destruction of habitat has adverse economic impacts on
the hunting, studying, photographing, and observing of migratory birds.
Lopez requires that the regulated activity have jurisdictional parameters.
The migratory bird rule establishes such limits regarding isolated waters
and wetlands. Lopez also precludes federal regulation into areas of
traditional state authority. The states do not have authority over
migratory birds, which are protected by international treaties and federal
statutes. Section 404 acknowledges and encourages state authority. In
addition, the regulation of the discharge of dredge and fill material is an
environmental regulation, not a land use control.
construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress." Edward D. Bartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr.
is not
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). This canon assumes that since the court
Congress
unless
majoritarian,
is
which
Congress,
to
politically accountable, it should defer
made clear error. In addition, the separation of powers dictates that the court does not rule
on constitutional issues not before it. The court should adopt an unproblematic
interpretation. Supreme Court-LeadingCases, supra note 224, at 533-34.
520. For every canon, there is an opposing canon. There is no indication that Congress
is aware of the canons. Canons are flawed presumptions about legislative intent and are
contrary to legislative supremacy. Mikva & Lane, supra note 52, at 129-30; Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 217, at 595-98.
521. Supreme Court-LeadingCases, supra note 224, at 534-36.
522. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 512, at 346-47, 421-24.
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The Court's decision in SWANCC puts at risk a great many
isolated waters and wetlands that are rapidly disappearing. Isolated
waters and wetlands are collective goods that perform important
national functions, including migratory bird habitat. It is difficult to
protect this public resource because market forces are not particularly
sensitive to collective benefits.-2 Reducing the scope of federal protection
of isolated waters and wetlands enhances the possibility of their
destruction through economic development, replaying the "tragedy of
the commons."524 Furthermore, as William Saxbe, former Attorney
General, noted,
if we fail save the wetlands, we will be losing more than an
economic and aesthetic asset that can never be re-created.
The loss may also signal an impending and crushing defeat
in the larger effort to maintain an environment that
civilized man can inhabit.5
The impact of the Court's statutory and constitutional interpretation on the future of environmental law is debatable. 52 The SWANCC
decision can be viewed as a narrow issue of statutory interpretation
revolving around an ambiguous statutory provision or as a threat to
environmental statutes.527 The latter position is more accurate. Federal
environmental statutes assume broad federal authority.5 2 8 The Court is
invoking states' rights to constrain federal authority and national

523. Blumm, supra note 120, at 471-72.
524. Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
525. Address by Attorney General Saxbe, Conference on the Protection of Gulf Coast
Wetlands (July 18, 1974), cited in Comprehensive Wetlands Protection: One Step Closer to Full
Implementation of § 404 of the FWPCA, 5 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,099, 10,104 (1975).
526. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 505; Timothy S. Bishop, Kyle F. Waldinger, &
Elizabeth A. Clark, One for the Birds: The Corps of Engineers' "MigratoryBird Rule," 30 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,633 (2000); Charles Tiefer, After Morrison, Can Congress Preserve Environmental
Laws from Commerce Clause Challenge? 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,888 (2000); Philip Weinberg,
Does That Line in the Sand Include Wetlands? CongressionalPower and Environmental Protection,
30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,894 (2000).
527. See generally William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution:
SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,741 (2001); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Curious
Flight of the Migratory Bird Rule, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,079 (2001); Tiefer, supra note 83; Healy
supra note 7; Kendall et al., supra note 499; Craig, supra note 100; McAllister & Glicksman,
supra note 332; Arthur P. Mizzi, Impact of Solid Waste Agency Decision on the 10th Circuit and
Environmental Laws, 30 COLO. LAW. 109, 111-12 (July2001); Buchsbaum, SWANCC: A Retreat
from FederalRegulation of Land Use?, supra note 486.
528. Other environmental statutes that could be threatened are CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601 et seq. (2000); the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§
1201 et seq. (2000); and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§
6901 et seq. (2000). See Brief of the States of California et al. at 19, SWANCC v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
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policies.5 9 The Court's reliance on textualism, requirement of clear
statements, invocation of statutory canons, and disregard for executive
precedent makes it difficult for Congress to legislate and delegate
administrative authority and for executive agencies to implement
statutes. Under the guise of federalism the Court in SWANCC reversed
the decisions of democratically accountable lawmakers and imposed its
own ideological view. ' This is not a positive sign for the future of
environmental law.us
532
The Court is well aware of the existing political landscape.
Institutional self-interest generally dictates that the Court will not act to
3
frustrate the policy goals of the Congress and the Executive Branch.
The Court began to limit federal authority over the states in the 1990s
3
under the protection of Republican President George H.W. Bush.14 The
Court restricted federal authority over action that ostensibly fell within
state jurisdiction in 1995 under the protection of a Republican Congress
until 2001, then a Republican House and President. The Republican
takeover of the Congress in the 2002 midterm elections will encourage
the Court to establish greater limits on federal authority. Furthermore, if
President Bush is afforded the opportunity to replace one of the
moderate justices on the Court with a justice in the mold of Justice Scalia
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 217, at 642-44.
Judge Wilkinson observed,
the values of federalism must be tempered by the maxims of prudence and
restraint....A wholesale invalidation of environmental, civil rights, and
business regulation would signal a different and disturbing regime-one
other than that which we now have. If modem activism accelerates to a
gallop, then this era will go the way of its discredited forbearer.
Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Instit., 169 F.3d 820, 897-98 (4th Cir. 1999). See also J. Harvie
Wilkinson II, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 779, 801-09 (1989).
531. Several commentators observed that conservative judicial activism is not the
traditional role of the courts and noted that
[flederal courts have been instrumental to the success of the environmental movement. They have traditionally sustained the policy choices
made by the public and the Congress to protect the environment. They
generally have respected the Constitution and long-standing precedent in
upholding environmental protection against industry-launched attacks.
They have ensured adequate access to the courts by citizens harmed by
violations of environmental laws. As a result, our air, lakes, rivers, and
other natural resources are far better off than they were in decades past.
The antienvironmental judicial activism that has emerged in recent years
threatens all we have gained.
Kendall et al., supra note 499, at 10,852.
532. See generally Eskridge, supra note 126; Farber & Frickey, supra note 126; Friedman,
supranote 126; Tiefer, supra note 53, at 212-31.
533. William N. Eskridge & John Frejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory
of American Federalism,47 VAND. L. REv. 1355, 1359-60, 1362, 1367 (1994).
534. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
529.
530.
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or Justice Thomas, this will accelerate the Court's efforts to elevate states'
rights and support economic development that poses risks to the
environment.5 As E.J. Dionne, a noted Washington Post reporter,
observed, "The doctrine of states' rights, so often invoked as a principle,
is almost always a pretext to deny the federal government authority to
do things conservatives dislike. These include.. .increasing protection for
the environment and regulating business."3

535. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 512, at 347; Kendall et al., supra note 499, at 10,83537, 10,852; Tiefer, supranote 526, at 10,891-93; Gerhardt, supra note 527, at 11,084-85.
536. E.J. Dionne, Jr., When States' Rights Get in the Way, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002, at
A19.

